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We present a detailed semantics for linguistic spatial expressions supportive of computa-
tional processing that draws substantially on the principles and tools of ontological engi-
neering and formal ontology. We cover language concerned with space, actions in space
and spatial relationships and develop an ontological organization that relates such expres-
sions to general classes of ﬁxed semantic import. The result is given as an extension of a
linguistic ontology, the Generalized Upper Model, an organization which has been used for
over a decade in natural language processing applications. We describe the general nature
and features of this ontology and show how we have extended it for working particu-
larly with space. Treaitng the semantics of natural language expressions concerning space
in this way offers a substantial simpliﬁcation of the general problem of relating natural
spatial language to its contextualized interpretation. Example speciﬁcations based on nat-
ural language examples are presented, as well as an evaluation of the ontology’s coverage,
consistency, predictive power, and applicability.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The relation between language and space has long been an area of active research (cf. [152,74,106,27,28,154,111]). Human
languages impose particular linguistic constructions of space, of spatially-anchored events, and of spatial conﬁgurations
that relate in complex ways to the spatial situations in which they are used. Establishing tighter formal speciﬁcations
of this relationship has proved a considerable challenge and has so far eluded general solutions. One reason for this is
that the precise nature of the contribution made by spatial language has been conceived too simply. In much earlier and
ongoing work, language is assumed to offer a relatively simple inventory of terms for which spatial interpretations can be
directly stated. Examples of this can be found not only in accounts that focus on formalizations of particular tasks, such
as path descriptions [112], scene descriptions [33], navigation and way-ﬁnding [158,163,140], but also in foundational work
on the formal ontology of space [30,120,22], on qualitative spatial calculi [43,42], and on cognitive approaches involving,
for example, image schemas [135,97]. In all of these approaches the principal burden of explanation is located within
the non-linguistic formalizations pursued. This produces characterizations of spatial semantics that mirror the tasks and
formal criteria addressed rather than the properties required for treating spatial language. As we shall argue below, such
characterizations turn out to be ill-suited for dealing with the extreme ﬂexibility of spatial language use observable in real
contexts.
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brings to the interpretation of space. In particular, we consider language as contributing a structure of the spatial world that
can be formulated as an ontology. This organization provides an additional layer of ontological information that formalizes
the ‘semantic commitments’ entered into by any linguistic spatial construction. Such semantic commitments are intended
to capture precisely the degree of formalization required to explain the linguistic options taken up while at the same time
avoiding over-commitment with respect to the physical or conceptual spatial situations in which those linguistic options may
be exercised. This then serves as an intermediate ‘interface ontology’ supporting mediation between linguistic forms on the
one hand and contextualized interpretations on the other. We organize this intermediate layer around the central notion of
‘spatial modalities’, abstract categories that group collections of similarly functioning linguistic spatial constructions together
without committing to particular contextual interpretations. For example, linguistic constructions involving the prepositions
‘at’, ‘near’ and so on are related to the spatial modality Proximal, which stands in contrast to Distal and is a superconcept
of spatial modalities involved with lateral (left–right) and frontal (front–back) ‘projection’. The characterization of the lin-
guistic expression “Bill is waiting at the post oﬃce” as expressing the spatial modality Proximal then makes commitments
to a functional connection between the person waiting and the post oﬃce without (wrongly) committing to a spatial con-
textualization involving containment; both inside and outside the post oﬃce are still compatible with descriptions with ‘at’.
An expression ‘near the post oﬃce’ brings in addition a contribution from the spatial modality Disjointness and so overlaps
with, but is distinct from, ‘at’. The interface ontology as a whole provides a rich web of semantic inter-relationships; each
of the spatial modalities we deﬁne brings with it semantic commitments that help constrain appropriate contextualizations.
This paper motivates the design of the ontology in depth and provides extensive details of its use.
Constructing a view of spatial semantics as an additional layer of ontology in this way brings several advantages crucial
for adequately capturing the relationship between language use and spatial interpretation. First, it supports the application
of the full range of methods developed within ontological engineering and applied ontology in order to organize the in-
formation necessary in ways that conform to a strict and formally speciﬁed modeling style [65,67,148]. Second, it provides
a suitable level of abstraction for dealing effectively with spatial language and for describing what linguistic expressions
themselves bring to the interpretation process—something that has not been found possible when focusing on linguistic ele-
ments as isolated terms. And third, it allows the relationship between linguistic expressions and spatial interpretation to be
recast as a particular case of ontological alignment, or mediation, whereby two or more distinct ontologies are brought into
a formal relationship [89,100,99,80,98]. Combining these considerations establishes a formally robust and well grounded
framework from which to consider the full ﬂexibility required for dealing with the mapping between language and space.
A distinct, well-deﬁned and empirically-motivated layer of semantics for spatial language of this kind has direct appli-
cations for many currently relevant tasks involving spatial language. These include attempts to support communication via
natural language with the human users of Geographic Information Systems [21,118,97,24], of context-based services [20],
and of devices operating in space, such as situated robots [137,122,96]. In addition, the growing demand for automatic en-
richment of textual data with spatial annotations in the context of the semantic web raises precisely analogous issues [116].
In all of these areas, solutions to the language–space mapping problem are urgently required. We also suggest that the
organization we propose is equally relevant as a contribution to the linguistic discussion of space, particularly concerning
how the interpretation of spatial language can be managed.
We organize our discussion as follows. In Section 2 we establish precisely why we consider spatial language to demand
its own layer of ontological description. We then present in Section 3 two examples of linguistic spatial descriptions illus-
trating the general spatial categories of our linguistic ontology and their connection both to natural language constructions
and to formal contextualized interpretations. In Section 4 we turn to the detailed structure and deﬁnitions of our linguistic
ontology, including illustrative examples. Section 5 discusses issues concerning applicability and use of the ontology, and
in Section 6 we address evaluation—itself now an area of increasing importance for ontological engineering in general. In
Section 7, we conclude with a summary of what has been achieved and consider future research tasks.
2. The case for a linguistic ontology for space
Our claim is that the processing of authentic spatial language requires a particular kind of knowledge to be captured—
knowledge concerning the range of spatially-related meanings that language itself, or languages themselves, construct. This
knowledge and its organization have been dealt with inadequately hitherto despite the fact that much is now known
concerning the linguistic construction of space. Linguistic investigations of spatial semantics, particularly approaches from
Talmy, Langacker, Vandeloise, Bierwisch, Lang, Levinson and others [152,155,106,25,105,161,110], have revealed broadly sim-
ilar mechanisms at work across cultures and types of language use and a considerable body of work has emerged building
on these foundations. Detailed studies of spatial language use can be found in contexts ranging over formal semantic inter-
pretations, psychological studies, dialogue analysis, computational modeling and many more [128,159,160,36,157,7,44]. The
insights gained in this tradition provide the starting point for the formalization we propose. It is of particular importance to
be clear about just how substantial this previous work is and, for this reason, our bibliographical references are extensive—
although still by no means exhaustive. So far, few attempts have been made to bring this substantial body of information
together within a uniﬁed account supportive of automatic processing. We propose here for the ﬁrst time a comprehensive
approach to combining the various contributions that also relates them to non-linguistic spatial interpretations.
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The fundamental question at issue has been framed succinctly by Bierwisch: ‘How much space gets into language’ [26]?
We propose for this a linguistically-motivated ontology, or ‘linguistic ontology’ for short, that provides a speciﬁcation of an
encapsulated layer of ontological information motivated solely by the requirements of linguistically-expressed spatial mean-
ings. This provides a new layer of organization for capturing the contribution of language to spatial interpretation that is
free of non-linguistic, contextually-dependent additions. We thereby decompose and modularize the problem of interpreting
and producing spatial language by ‘stratifying’ three ways: (i) lexicogrammatically, (ii) according to a shallow semantics,
and (iii) by contextualized speciﬁcations—all three of which are formally distinct. The application of ontological engineering
methods then offers considerable beneﬁts for teasing apart the respective contributions made by these essentially distinct
knowledge sources.
We motivate the use of a linguistic ontology intermediate between linguistic expressions and their contextualized inter-
pretation by brieﬂy considering three perspectives relevant to the modeling of spatial language: we need to address (a) the
linguistic phenomena of spatial language use, (b) the formalization of spatial language interpretations, and (c) the com-
putational instantiation of processing schemes for natural language involving space. In all three domains there is striking
converging evidence in favor of characterizing the relative contributions of spatial language, particularly spatial semantics,
and domain or task descriptions of space in the manner we suggest.
2.1. Evidence from linguistic usage
Early work in the semantics of spatial language began with a predominantly geometric perspective that still exerts consid-
erable inﬂuence today. Under this view, the semantics of a spatial expression is related quite directly to a spatially-speciﬁed
situation. For example, the semantics of a prepositional phrase involving the English preposition in might be given using a
two-place predicate of the form:
in(x, y)
interpreted to mean that some spatially-locatable entity x in the world is contained geometrically within the boundaries of
some spatially-identiﬁable region y. Problematic with this account, and all modiﬁcations of it, are the basic facts of linguistic
usage. Extensive illustrations of this have been given by Herskovits [74]—one of which concerned with the preposition ‘in’
is presented in Fig. 1. In the situations depicted we cannot say, on the right-hand side, that the potato is ‘in’ the bowl even
though it is, in some sense, completely contained geometrically, although, on the left-hand side, we can say that the bulb is
in the socket even though it is patently not contained.
The kind of spatial meaning involved with ‘in’ is termed a topological spatial relation. Such relations generally locate
an entity with respect to some speciﬁed region but do so in a way that makes it diﬃcult to identify the regions that
are applicable in any particular case. Although a ‘naive’, or pre-theoretical, consideration might suggest relations based on
geometry (e.g., containment for ‘in’), this leaves many common instances of use to be considered as exceptions. Commonly
proposed meanings for ‘in’ include at least [74,55,39,24]:
• geometrical containment,
• containment within a concavity (‘in a cup’),
• containment within a containing surface (‘a crack in the glass’),
• interposition among elements (‘in a forest’),
• location within/among elements of an aggregate (‘in a town’, ‘within/among buildings’).
These all involve some notion of ‘containment’ but precisely what is contained where is quite varied. Considerable effort has
been expended in trying to bridge the gap evident between geometric descriptions of spatial situations and the kinds of
meanings listed but, in general, the problem remains unsolved.
Bennett and Agarwal term these kinds of alternatives modes of locating and hosting and simply accept them as alternative
meanings requiring alternative formalizations [24]. This ‘gets the job done’ as far as moving forward on spatial formalization
is concerned but does not go far towards explaining linguistic usage. Indeed, the situation is even worse in that each of
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sentence such as (1), for example,
(1) I am in the tree.
Herskovits suggests that we can build on geometrical containment by adopting the three-dimensional convex hull of the
tree rather than the tree itself. Whereas in a sentence such as (2),
(2) I am in Bruxelles.
Bennett and Agarwal propose that in this case the region for a containment relation is ‘footprint’ containment, whereby
the two-dimensional ‘footprint’ of the spatial extent of the speaker (‘I’) is taken to be a spatial part of the two-dimensional
‘footprint’ of the spatial extent of Bruxelles. This is clearly an adequate analysis neither of example (1), nor of the examples
depicted in Fig. 1.
In short, we arrive at a proliferation of formalizations for which it may be possible to force an interpretation in terms of
some topological inclusion relationship but the main problem is actually deciding on which regions may be playing a role
or not. If this is left suﬃciently free, the geometric account is essentially empty—some region will always be constructible
post hoc. The source of explanations is therefore located within contextualized interpretations without telling us precisely
how such contextualization might be reached.
Another class of spatial meanings is described in terms of projective relations, such as ‘in front of’, ‘left of’, etc. These
are more complex than topological relations in several ways. Their interpretation relies on the additional step of ﬁxing
an underlying reference system [110], deﬁned relative to the speaker or hearer, or with respect to some object’s intrinsic
or imposed orientation properties (‘my left’ vs. ‘your left’, ‘the front of the church’, or ‘in front of the rolling ball’, etc.).
Unless the reference system is known, projective spatial expressions cannot be related unambiguously to spatial context.
Nevertheless, it is precisely this crucial information that our English and German data show to be most commonly left
implicit in natural dialogue, requiring resolution during interaction or from context [19]. Providing maximal support and
constraint for this resolution is then extremely important for effective spatial language processing.
The problems that arise when attempting to ﬁx the spatial import of projective relations are very similar to those
of topological relations. We can show this drawing on the most commonly used formalizations proposed for projective
relations, those of spatial templates [37,113], or ﬁeld potentials [64,129]. These formalizations build on the observation that
projective terms appear to identify general directions rather than precise orientations. For example, ‘to the left of X’ picks
out a general direction towards the left but is not restricted to a 90◦ angle. Use of projective terms therefore suggests a
graded applicability structure, whereby one direction may be a ‘best’ exemplar (a ‘focal axis’) but other directions are also
acceptable to the extent that they approximate this best case. This can be captured by deﬁning for each projective relation
a probability ﬁeld that reﬂects the likelihood of application of a term given a particular spatial position. This approach is
applied in computational approaches to robotics and perception where a robot may need to interpret linguistic descriptions
(particularly expressions containing spatial prepositions) to follow particular paths or locate objects [136,90,150,124,91].
More complex expressions (e.g., ‘in front and to the left of X’) are generally interpreted by deﬁning compositions of the
individual ﬁelds involved.
The graded probability of location obtained within such accounts often matches applicability judgements made by speak-
ers with respect to spatial situations relatively well. But there remain problems, most signiﬁcant of which is the basic issue
of just how the potential ﬁeld relevant for a particular communicative situation is to be determined. Potential ﬁelds need
to be parameterized in various ways (e.g., by being stretched or relaxed according to relative size and orientation [166,74],
with respect to potential distractors [91], and according to the selected reference frame), but the precise motivations for
that parameterization are often context speciﬁc or ad hoc. This is exactly analogous to the problem with topological spatial
terms: just as it was unclear what regions are called for, here it is equally unclear just what kind of ﬁeld is appropriate.
Natural language usage is, moreover, substantially more varied than a straightforward parameterized selection of ap-
plicability ﬁelds would suggest. Consider, for example, the interpretation of even seemingly simple linguistic expressions
involving left. A common interpretation compatible with potential ﬁelds would be in terms of an area of high probability
along an axis situated 90◦ counter-clockwise with respect to some reference object plus an orientation. However, in dif-
ferent contexts ‘left’ can equally well denote the entire ‘left-hand’ half-plane, a reorientation by an angle of contextually
determined size or a redirection of movement, i.e., the expression turn left may denote a change of orientation (on the spot),
a change of movement direction without a reorientation (as, for example, in a sideways motion or with non-oriented enti-
ties such as balls), or both (intuitively the normal case in route instructions). Worse, in the case of a street network, ‘turn
left at the next junction’ has little to do with a focal axis: in fact, the ﬁeld collapses according to the actual possibilities
provided by the road network. If there are several roads on the ‘left-hand side’ it is not enough to pick the one that is
closest to a 90◦ angle and to call that the ‘left turn’, since all the turns on the left are ‘left turns’ in some sense; a more
discriminating description is required [93].
Field potentials are also used for other spatial relations with similar accompanying problems. For example, one model of
the spatial expression ‘at X’ might be as a circular ﬁeld centered (i.e., with highest probability) on the element X. Or, a model
of the expression ‘along X’ might be a ﬁeld that follows the shape of the spatial element X [167]. But in each case, just what
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shape of ﬁeld is to be picked as well as how it is to be positioned with respect to the current spatial situation represents a
diﬃcult interpretative decision in its own right. One last illustration of this is given in Fig. 2; this shows a repositioning of a
potential ﬁeld that is extreme, while still remaining a straightforwardly everyday example of spatial language that is unlikely
to strike any but the most literal of interpreters (e.g., us and the computational systems we construct) as strange. The
example concerns the spatial relationship ‘between’; if asked without any context what the appropriate potential ﬁeld for
describing the spatial situation corresponding to the spatial expression ‘between X and Y’ might be, it would be reasonable
to expect that points nearer to a line connecting X and Y would receive a higher probability than points lying further away.
The ﬁgure shows, however, that the information given in the explanatory sign (‘swim only between the red and yellow
ﬂags’) intends to pick out a completely different spatial situation and, what is more, ‘effortlessly’ succeeds in doing so—
violating on the way a ‘universal’ hypothesized by Zwarts that the spatial interpretations of simple prepositional phrases
necessarily contain their reference objects [168, p. 80].
Such examples show that relating a linguistic term to a probability ﬁeld conﬂates at least two steps: the selection of a
contextual interpretation and the generation of a ﬁeld appropriate to that contextual interpretation. But, as with topolog-
ical regions, it is precisely this ﬁrst stage that is the main problem facing spatial language interpretation and production.
Discussions of spatial terms often fail to separate these two stages and so already incorporate particular contextualized
interpretations in their consideration of the linguistic semantics involved. With respect to projective terms, such discussion
leads to the misconception that graded applicability structure is an integral part of some spatial term’s semantics [74],
whereas it is actually a property of the contextualization [157]. It is only when we have the contextualization that we can
go on to identify which kind and shape of probability ﬁeld may be required and it is only there that we can observe graded
applicability. But to reach this stage, we must ﬁrst unravel the linguistic contribution to the contextualization process.
A third area of diﬃculty with natural language usage is the considerable ‘ontological ﬂexibility’ that spatial terms exhibit.
Depending on their context of use, particular spatial terms take on quite different properties. One classic statement of this
was given by Hobbs over a decade ago. Consider the ontological status of a spatial entity such as a ‘road’:
“When we are planning a trip, we view it as a line. When we are driving on it, we have to worry about our placement
to the right or left, so we think of it as a surface. When we hit a pothole, it becomes a volume for us” [78, p. 820].
These quite different ‘conceptualizations’ give rise to correspondingly different linguistic descriptions, or grammatical syn-
dromes as we will characterize them below—such as ‘along the road’, ‘on the road’, ‘in the road’, and so on. Each of these
possibilities commits to a certain range of properties for the object described, but those properties are only indirectly re-
lated to ontological properties of the entity in the world. Indeed, even the selection of a lexical item, such as ‘road’, cannot
be taken as a neutral labelling of reality. There may be considerable uncertainty as to where the limits of applicability of
a term might lie and to what follows from such an application once made; this problem has received considerable study
in the area of geographic entities [23,147]. In general, the diverging identity criteria necessary for the entities picked out by
linguistic classiﬁcations and by entities ‘in the world’ demand an ontological separation [31,68].1
Language usage itself requires us, moreover, to distinguish between at least ‘objects’ and the ‘places’ where such objects
may be located [103]. Several grammatical tests support this distinction. Asher, for example, suggests use of a grammatical
alternation involving (in English) in or at versus inside [5]. This test relies on the fact that it is quite dispreferred to say that
one is ‘inside’ a region; this motivates the contrasting acceptability judgements observable in examples (3)–(4):
(3) The tractor is in the ﬁeld.
(4) ??? The tractor is inside the ﬁeld.
1 For a rather different approach to some aspects of this issue, see Pustejovsky’s use of ‘dotted types’ within the generative lexicon [133, p. 334].
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just what that place is.
It is also clear that language usage demands an account in which geometric modeling is often not the primary consider-
ation. One extension beyond geometric information now ﬁnding wide acceptance is the inclusion of functional notions [161].
Functional relationships obtain whenever the use or behavior of one entity depends in some way on another. There is now
strong evidence that a broad range of spatial terms are crucially sensitive to functional features [45,36]. For example, ac-
ceptability judgements for the use of ‘above’ when referring to a tube of toothpaste geometrically ‘above’ a toothbrush vary
systematically according to whether the precise placement is supportive of putting the toothpaste on the brush or not;
moreover, for some particular linguistic terms, it is the functional information that appears to be a stronger conditioning
factor of use whereas, for others, it is the geometric contribution that appears stronger [46].
Common functional notions include ‘control’ and ‘support’. These deal succinctly with the problematic uses of ‘in’ shown
in Fig. 1 above: the bulb is ‘in’ the socket because it is ‘functionally controlled’ by this placement—if we move the socket the
bulb moves, if we remove the socket, the bulb falls, etc.; similarly, the potato is not ‘in’ the bowl because it is not controlled
by the bowl—if we lift the bowl the potato stays where it is. It does not appear plausible at this time to reduce the functional
to the geometric, or vice versa. Indeed, language usage in general is most responsive to perceived (interpretation) or claimed
(production) functional relationships—regardless of their geometric support.
In all three of the areas of linguistic usage discussed—topological terms, projective terms, and the ontological ﬂexibility of
spatial categorization—we ﬁnd considerable subtlety being introduced by the need to consider language. There are distinct
kinds of information, or entities, being drawn upon which may not be evident when considering a treatment of space
independently of language. The complex and situation-dependent relationship of these entities to spatial interpretation calls
for their own layer of ontological modeling.
2.2. Formalization evidence
In the previous subsection we have seen that language use is very ﬂexible. In this subsection, we focus on some of
the problems that this ﬂexibility brings for formalization—at this stage still independently of whether a computational in-
stantiation is being targeted. Formalizing the meanings entailed by this ﬂexibility clariﬁes further the diﬃculties involved.
Particularly problematic is the fact that speciﬁc linguistic terms have been taken to require very different logical formaliza-
tions in different circumstances. This follows directly from the sheer diversity of Bennett and Agarwal’s ‘modes of locating
and hosting’ mentioned above. As they write:
“Because of the ambiguity of natural language, there will not be a deﬁnite mapping between natural language terms and
elements of this semantic theory. Rather, we shall ﬁnd that each natural language term has a number of distinct senses,
corresponding to different ways in which the interpreted entity can be interpreted within our semantic framework” [24,
p. 80].
But from a linguistic perspective, allowing unrelated meanings within a lexical item is less than satisfactory. It is often a
sign of missed generalizations and complicates processing. Here we wish to ensure that we do not lose the strong sense in
which shared grammatical constructions share important aspects of their meaning.
The interposition of a knowledge organization mediating between linguistic form and contextualized interpretation, i.e.,
our linguistic ontology, attempts to capture these shared aspects directly so as to provide a more parsimonious framework
for integrating the ‘distinct senses’ of spatial expressions proposed in the literature. These distinct senses are often only
required because they are already attempting to model contextualized interpretations. In effect, each formalization has already
committed to a particular usage in context without telling us how that might have been reached. Accounts are then forced
to simply include further alternate logical forms within the lexicon entries involved. Building a more abstract, linguistically-
sensitive layer of formalization into the account allows us to move beyond this in order to be more supportive of ﬂexible
spatial language usage that is nevertheless constrained to lie within the range of variation that naturally occurs.
In many respects, our formalization approach is analogous to the direction started by Bierwisch. Bierwisch [26, p. 36], for
example, presents the following two examples illustrating considerable diversity in meaning for very similar constructions:
(5) He left the institute an hour ago.
(6) He left the institute a year ago.
In (5) we appear to be dealing with a change of location; in (6), however, the meaning appears to be a change of social
aﬃliation. Bierwisch’s method of dealing with this diversity is to interpose a semantic representation that is neutral between
the distinct contextualized readings. In this case, a single semantic representation is postulated, centered around a generative
semantics-style predicate-argument expression such as:
[x DO [BECOME [NEG [x AT y]]]]
The central ‘spatial’ component involving the semantic prime ‘AT’ is then kept neutral between x being spatially located
proper within the physical space of the institute and x changing their social aﬃliation with the abstract entity constituting
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to provide a suitable starting point for contextualization.
In several more recent approaches to the formalization of linguistic spatial expressions, we ﬁnd this separation of con-
cerns not being followed. It is therefore interesting and relevant to consider brieﬂy whether the problems of usage of
linguistic spatial terms introduced above are appropriately included in these approaches. Kracht [94], for example, presents
an extensive, typologically-motivated proposal for the semantics of many spatial expressions in terms of a presumed uni-
versal semantically transparent phrase structure of the form:
[MP M [LP L [DP Landmark ]]]
This represents structurally an assumption that locative expressions consist of two ‘layers’, one of which Kracht terms the
conﬁguration, the other the mode. Conﬁgurations capture mutual static spatial relations between objects and are expressed
as ‘location phrases’ (LP); modes capture movements with respect to those conﬁgurations via ‘mode phrases’ (MP). An
important beneﬁt of Kracht’s approach is that the semantics of such phrases, combinations of such phrases, and their
embedding within larger syntactic contexts are all constructed in a strictly compositional and well-speciﬁed fashion. This is
a desirable property for any account and is certainly one which we attempt to maintain in our own approach. Particularly
telling, however, are the consequences for compositionality that Kracht’s basic assumptions give rise to.
Kracht takes the semantics of spatial expressions to be temporally parameterized spatial neighborhoods in three-
dimensional space. In particular, the lexical semantic content of spatial terms, such as prepositions, is provided by a
collection of specially deﬁned localization functions whose task is to map given spatial neighborhoods to other geomet-
rically related spatial neighborhoods. For example, the semantics of the preposition ‘in’ under this account is a function
that requires an object x and a time t and which produces the set of regions that are contained in the inside of x at that
time t . Now, while this is without doubt a possible and appropriate contextualized interpretation of some uses of spatial
expressions, it is by no means clear that this is an appropriate semantics for the linguistic expressions themselves—for all
of the reasons of ﬂexibility sketched in the previous subsection. The consequences of this for compositionality are, however,
substantial and Kracht himself notes that he explicitly wishes to exclude examples of the kind Herskovits discusses; in fact:
“. . . there are many instances where [the semantics of localizers we have given] fail to do justice to our intuitions.
Moreover, there invariably are borderline cases. For example, when is some object x at an object y, and when is it on y?
. . . It is diﬃcult to imagine how a strictly compositional account would handle this problem, and we shall have to leave
it aside” [94, p. 191].
Thus, compositionality is only maintained in this account by relying on the natural compositionality of geometric operations
on regions: linguistic compositionality has been made dependent on a particular (contextualized) spatial interpretation, one
which, as we have seen, is itself problematic.
A similar diﬃculty arises in the combinatory categorial grammar approach to spatial expressions proposed by Francez
and Steedman [58]. This account, although couched within a very different formal and linguistic framework, makes the
same assumption that an appropriate semantics for spatial expressions is a speciﬁcation of the regions of three-dimensional
space that those expressions pick out. Here, as is usual within combinatory categorial grammar accounts, the semantics of
larger expressions is constructed via function application over the semantics of component expressions as determined by the
internal structure of complex syntactic categories. Francez and Steedman add to this semantics explicit spatial and temporal
‘contextual variables’ which, during function application, collect additional constraints via so-called ‘shift-functions’ [58,
p. 394]. In the case of spatial expressions, the role of these functions is to take some spatial region and to modify, or ‘shift’,
this to produce another region related in some particular speciﬁed way to the originating one.
The precise semantics of these shift-functions is not Francez and Steedman’s main focus—they are primarily concerned
with achieving an appropriately compositional account that adequately reﬂects the role of context. In this respect, there is
much to be taken from the mechanisms they propose. However, it is clear that these shift-functions are, again, being seen
primarily as involving geometric operations. This can perhaps be explained in relation to the origins of their approach in
Pratt and Francez’s treatment of temporal semantics in terms of contextual variables [131]. In that account, the semantics
of temporal expressions is related directly to temporal interval logics, enabling the interpretation of linguistic temporal
expressions to proceed in step with the operations these logics support. Whereas this treatment is very appealing for
treatments of temporal language, the use of spatial language shows considerably more ﬂexibility and it is by no means clear
which ‘logics’ (and there are many (cf. [42,1])) may appropriately play the role that is played by temporal interval logics
in the case of time. It is clear, however, that Euclidean three-dimensional geometry does not provide a suﬃcient basis; this
situation therefore needs to ﬁnd appropriate consideration within any account that seeks to cover a broader range of natural
spatial language usage.2
The direction we follow in our development of a linguistic ontology for spatial language accordingly draws on a further
class of recent approaches to the semantics of spatial language. These are approaches which use linguistic evidence in order
2 More discussion of Kracht’s and Francez and Steedman’s accounts with respect to our requirements for spatial contextualization is given in Bate-
man [13].
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rather than relating this immediately to contextualized interpretations in a three-dimensional space. This follows further
the ‘two-level’ approach of Bierwisch introduced above, but begins spelling out in considerably more detail the linguistic
side of the spatial equation.
An early detailed account of this kind was Eschenbach’s [53] formalization of spatial expressions such as ‘left’/‘right’, ‘in
front of’/‘behind’, etc. In this framework, an abstract geometric structure covering the semantic commitments of language is
imposed on the concrete spatial situation, depending on the binding of some speciﬁc, well-deﬁned contextual anchors. The
linguistic semantics is then couched in terms of abstract algebraic structures, with their own entities and properties—for
example, that required for ‘left’/‘right’ involves half-planes, that for ‘in front of’/‘behind’ involves oriented half-lines—which
may then be ‘anchored’ into particular contexts in a ﬂexible but well-deﬁned fashion; we have discussed this approach
and its relation to linguistic ontology elsewhere [19]. Another well developed account in this spirit is the work by Zwarts
on the semantics of location and path expressions [168,169]. Employing several distinct kinds of linguistic evidence (most
interestingly, aspect), Zwarts [169] develops in a style analogous to that of Eschenbach an algebraic theory that yields
appropriate properties for path descriptions constructed compositionally during the interpretation of prepositional phrases,
combinations of prepositional phrases, and prepositional phrases combined with other spatially-relevant material in their
respective verb phrases. Again, these constructions must be seen ﬁrst and foremost as abstract spatial interpretations of
linguistic spatial descriptions which may stand in more or less complex relationships with actual spatial situations.
We consider the moves being made in this direction as offering strong evidence in favor of the kind of modularity that
we pursue here. Distinguishing a linguistic spatial semantics from contextualized spatial interpretations appears to be a
beneﬁcial, and perhaps even necessary, step towards getting the full ﬂexibility of spatial language usage under theoretical
and formal control. The main task facing the development of such a semantics further is then to characterize in detail what
kinds of abstract spatial conﬁgurations can be motivated linguistically, what their interrelationships and properties are, and
how they interact with other aspects of semantics and context.
2.3. Natural language processing concerns
The interpretation of spatial language raises similar general issues to those involved when trying to relate generic nat-
ural language processing components to the requirements of any speciﬁc domain. The basic premise we motivate here is
that it is useful from several perspectives to specify a level of representation that is intermediate between natural language
expressions on the one hand and formally speciﬁed characterizations of spatial situations on the other. A separation of
information into distinct modules of this kind is reminiscent both of earlier ‘two-level semantics’ accounts that have been
adopted in several natural language processing contexts [105,75] and of notions of ‘quasi-logical form’, originally advocated
in systems such as the Core Language Engine [2]. Our own use of a two-level architecture goes back to the Penman Up-
per Model, originally developed within the Penman text generation system in the mid-1980s [117,16,12]. This was, to our
knowledge, the ﬁrst approach to two-level semantics explicitly formulated as an ontology. Particularly within natural lan-
guage generation, it was recognized relatively early that organizing ‘domain knowledge’ in a way that reﬂected its expression
in natural language would more readily support generic natural language generation applications. The Penman Upper Model
was accordingly deﬁned as an interface between application knowledge and linguistic knowledge, expressed as what we
would nowadays term a ‘lightweight ontology’ using the knowledge representation system LOOM [115].
The introduction of a further layer of domain-independent semantics between syntactic analysis/generation and domain
knowledge is a move now being suggested, apparently independently, as a component of several distinct approaches. Within
a parsing and interpretation context, it has been argued that such a semantic layer improves portability and re-use of
components within dialogue systems [51]; within a generation context, it has been argued similarly that compositional
semantics needs characterizations that capture how language decomposes entities and that this is, again, independent of
domain-speciﬁc organization [149]. Within the spatial domain, we also see language-motivated characterizations proposed
by Mavridis and Roy as a kind of ‘parsing’ of “situations into ontological types and relations that reﬂect human language
semantics” [122]. Here, just as in our case, the relationship to language is intended to support automatic natural language
processing, while the relationship to situations and ontological types is intended to ease their formal interpretation and
contextualization.
A further motivation for imposing this additional layering, or stratiﬁcation, of ‘ontological’ representations when consid-
ering language processing is that it provides a more appropriate modularization of concerns. Without stratiﬁcation there is
a tendency to equate existing foundational ontologies, such as DOLCE [119], SUMO [125] and so on, with natural language
semantics directly. Such treatments can be sophisticated [63,40], or more straightforward as in the direct linking of SUMO
categories with WordNet synsets [126] or in the inclusion of semantically-motivated categories as a proper part of the on-
tology as a whole, as in the Sensus ontology of the DARPA knowledge-sharing initiative [151] and the more recent Omega
effort [84,130], both of which build on developments of the Penman Upper Model mentioned above. Problematic in all these
cases is that they do not address the ontological ﬂexibility of natural language terms that we discussed above with respect
to the quote from Hobbs and, as a consequence, mix components of very different ontological statuses. A representation of
natural language semantics within a foundational ontology, for example as proposed for DOLCE by Cimiano and Reyle [40]
or for SWINTO (a combination of DOLCE and SUMO) by Oberle et al. [127], then commits to an inappropriate rigidity of
interpretation. Similar criticisms hold for links between lexical organizations, such as FrameNet, VerbNet, WordNet, etc. and
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diverse classiﬁcations according to the requirements of the discourse context. When bringing foundational ontologies and
linguistic information together, therefore, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the ontologically non-rigid nature of
linguistic classiﬁcation.
It is equally necessary to avoid importing into computational system design over-restrictive assumptions from theoretical
accounts. For example, Jørgensen and Lønning develop a Minimal Recursion Semantic analysis component for computational
use that is embedded within Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar and which implements fairly directly the account of
Kracht summarized above [88]. Based on Kracht’s assumptions, they assume that it should be reasonably straightforward to
move from their underspeciﬁed semantics to contextualized interpretation—however, as argued above, this will only hold
for geometrically transparent usages. It would be highly desirable to maintain the overall framework for interpretation that
they develop, while at the same time weakening the implicit reliance on geometry.
Our approach to meeting these requirements draws, as mentioned, on the course of development begun with the Pen-
man Upper Model. Here, the basic idea was to provide an ontology of categories and relations suﬃcient for driving all of the
decisions required by the linguistic components present in the system. Knowledge from particular domains was then made
accessible to the linguistic components by formally relating (at ﬁrst in terms of subsumption or inheritance) the concepts
from any speciﬁc domain to the concepts provided by the Upper Model ontology. Any domain-speciﬁc concept then inher-
ited appropriate ‘methods’ for linguistic expression [12, p. 57] and semantic speciﬁcations could employ domain knowledge
concepts freely, safe in the assumption that the linguistic components would know how to express those concepts via the
methods associated with the linked Upper Model concepts. Crucial to the design of the Upper Model was a commitment
to including distinctions only when they are motivated by speciﬁable contrasts in grammatical form. For this reason, we
consider an Upper Model to be a linguistically-motivated ontology representing that portion of the semantics of a natural
language that ﬁnds expression in that language’s grammar; similarities can usefully be drawn here with Jackendoff’s crite-
rion of grammatical effect [87, p. 13]. This guarantees that the relation to linguistic form is known—thereby supporting its use
in generation and analysis—while also moving the description towards semantics.
Basing design on grammatical evidence rather than lexical organization differentiates the Upper Model from other,
superﬁcially similar systems that have been developed on lexical grounds, such as FrameNet, VerbNet, WordNet and sys-
tems descended from these [85]. We consider the distinction between lexical semantics and grammatical semantics central
because lexical items tend to be too idiosyncratic in their bundling of semantic properties to reveal generic semantic con-
ﬁgurations.3 The Upper Model is therefore more closely related to approaches that adopt an explicit orientation to grammar
and grammatical distinctions for linking with semantics as now suggested across a very broad range of frameworks, from
generative grammar [109,87], through cognitive approaches [61], to social–functional accounts [70]. The degree to which it
is possible or desirable to bring the lexically and grammatically motivated organizations together remains an open issue at
this time.
Our main motivation for calling an organization of this kind an ontology then lies in the role we attribute to language of
structuring, or schematizing, experience. In many respects, just as any ‘reality’ is necessarily ﬁltered through our perceptual
systems, it is also ﬁltered through the language system—at the latest whenever we wish to communicate (‘thinking for
speaking’ [144]). We can therefore characterize this linguistically constructed reality in much the same way, and applying
similar principles, as adopted when characterizing other constructions of reality.
The concrete starting point for the work described in this paper is a particular extension to the original Upper Model
design made in the mid-1990s in order to meet new application demands. This involved both broadening the range of lan-
guages addressed and incorporating some generic semantic principles developed for ‘linguistically motivated’ ontologies [70].
The result was the Generalized Upper Model, referred to hereafter as GUM [18]. The GUM linguistic ontology provided a broad
basis for driving natural language generation, but did not treat spatial language with any degree of sophistication. There-
fore, in order to meet the requirements of a linguistically-motivated spatial organization as set out in this section, we have
developed GUM further in three main respects:
– First, we now work with an explicit orientation to the state of the art in formal ontological engineering, observing mod-
eling strategies from formal ontology [66,67,146] and enforcing criteria for ontological correctness from the OntoClean
methodology for ontology evaluation [68].
– Second, we specify the ontology so that it is usable for both generation and analysis, thereby providing a common source
and target semantic representation suitable for dialogue systems; this also provides a formal and logical representation
which can be used together with automatic consistency checking and reasoning.
– And third, drawing strictly on linguistic evidence, we have combined both the results of the existing literature of empir-
ical analyses of spatial language and conclusions from our own empirical studies of situated spatial discourse in order
to produce a highly detailed extension of GUM for the spatial domain.
3 It is sometimes suggested that lexicalizations, particularly basic level lexicalizations, are revealing of deep underlying categories, but the extent to which
this is true is debatable. We consider grammatical organization as necessarily a more robust indication of semantic import precisely because it needs to
generalize across both situations and individual types of entities; lexical organization, in contrast, has the task of being speciﬁc, of not generalizing. We
discuss this further in Section 3 on method below.
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We have argued that folding together contextualization and linguistic semantics in the area of spatial semantics leaves
an over-complex impression of the mechanisms involved. We need instead to isolate those linguistically-motivated semantic
distinctions that provide a basis for contextualization and which themselves generalize across contexts of use. In particular,
we need to provide an as exhaustive as possible characterization of the distinct kinds of spatial conﬁgurations and modes
constructed by a language and to formalize how these are deployed in the construction of the shallow semantics of sen-
tences as a whole. In Section 4 below we set out the categories of the linguistic ontology in detail; but ﬁrst, in the following
section, we prepare the ground for this by illustrating our methodology for designing a linguistically-motivated ontology
such as the Upper Model. This will also let us introduce some of the top-level concepts of the ontology that we require
below.
3. The development of a linguistic ontology of space
We emphasized in the previous section the importance we attribute to grammatical evidence. Focusing on the closed-
class, or grammatical, end of the spectrum of linguistic phenomena allows stronger claims to be made concerning the
coverage of the resulting semantic framework and its adequacy for explaining linguistic ﬂexibility. Attempting a grammat-
ical characterization for the spatial area is also of considerable interest for general linguistic reasons; Talmy claims, for
example, that the grammatical category of closed-class forms in its entirety is actually limited to a small range of concepts
coming from the spatial domain [154, p. 177]. In contrast, accounts starting from open-class items exhibit a tendency to slip
over from accounts of language to accounts more appropriately considered as domain-speciﬁc extensions of non-linguistic
ontologies. This is precisely the function of open-class items: to provide structure for all the various individual domains of
experience at issue for a culture. Grammatical semantics, on the other hand, is there to provide a generalized foundation
re-usable across domains [70].
Approaches that are not anchored in linguistics are naturally drawn to the lexical approach because it is the open-class
items that are easiest to ﬁnd without linguistic analysis. This also characterizes many computational and formal approaches
to spatial language, together with a restriction of attention to a rather small subset of the linguistic phenomena that ac-
tually contribute to the linguistic construction of space. This is not adequate for building a linguistic semantics because its
methodology is limited with respect both to the range of semantic distinctions that can be made visible and to the range of
linguistic data that can be drawn upon as evidence. As pointed out with particular force by Levinson, spatial information is
in fact distributed across at least determiners, adjectives, adpositions, relational nominals, adverbial nominals, grammatical
case, locative verbs, verbal aﬃxes, clitics and combinations of all of these [110, p. 99]; drawing on this range of evidence
provides a much broader foundation for identifying what language itself is doing with space. It also, although we will not
be able to address this here, prepares the ground effectively for accounts that apply across languages: as we shall see below,
most of the distinctions drawn in our spatial extension to GUM can be found across languages, although their particular
grammatical realizations may differ substantially.4
Our task here is to provide a level of semantic description that will support the process of contextualization. Such de-
scriptions must distinguish the spatial situation picked out by an utterance from all other grammatically distinguishable
situations without overcommitment: that is, the description captures formally just the degrees of ﬂexibility, or underspec-
iﬁcation, that the linguistic utterance itself leaves open. As mentioned above, we draw on several approaches that have
been taken in the literature for developing a level of description for spatial language of this kind. In particular, we proceed
in the directions proposed by Talmy [155], Bierwisch [26], Levinson [110] Halliday and Matthiessen [70], Eschenbach [53],
Zwarts [169] and others, combining these within an overarching ontological framework anchored in formal ontology. This
is organized in terms of appropriately motivated semantic types within the Generalized Upper Model linguistic ontol-
ogy.
The move from grammatical evidence to a linguistic ontology can be complex and it is not feasible in this paper to show
for each category just which range of linguistic phenomena is drawn upon; Tenbrink [157], for example, provides consider-
ably more detail. It is, as a consequence, easy to lose sight of our fundamental commitment that no semantic distinctions
be introduced unless we can specify their linguistic consequences. To show this process at work, however, we present two
examples of linguistic analysis of this kind, starting from the grammatical constructions involved and relating these to the
semantic conﬁgurations entailed. These conﬁgurations also provide our ﬁrst views of the ontological organization of the
Generalized Upper Model spatial extension.
4 This does not claim that all languages share all features; there are signiﬁcant differences which represent important objects of study in their own right.
There is also a need for considerably more study in the light of our argument below that full grammatical contexts need to be considered. Even traditional
differences discussed in the literature, such as the contrast between English in/on and German and Dutch in/an/auf, in/aan/op, etc. or the well-known
typological distinction between ‘satellite-framed’ and ‘verb-framed’ languages [153,145,154] reveal themselves to be less than clear-cut when naturally
occurring usage data are considered.
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The following is adapted from an original German example of a location description found in our own experimental
studies on spatial language use (cf. Section 6):
(7) To the left of the computer is a USB drive.
All the usual potential ambiguities mentioned in Section 2 above apply to this utterance, although in this case we know
precisely the spatial context and the dialogue development that led up to the utterance and so can reliably disambiguate.
Without this context, however, left of the computer could mean “to the left from your point of view” just as well as “to the
left from my point of view”, which can make a decisive difference if speaker and hearer do not share their view on the scene,
or the speaker may ascribe an intrinsic left side to the computer—typically, the side that is on the left when interacting
with it [73]—which is then independent of the current position of both speaker and hearer. As is overwhelmingly the case
in natural interactions, the linguistic structure of the example chooses not to reﬂect these conceptual options, leaving it to
the interaction and the hearer to resolve [157].
The utterance itself is an existential statement that ‘locates’ a ﬁgure with respect to a ground. The ﬁgure/ground dis-
tinction is widely accepted in spatial processing and perceptual psychology and is also regularly reﬂected grammatically in
language. Talmy, for example, proposes that the ﬁgure is conceived of as a moving or movable entity which is more relevant
in the present context, while the ground serves as a reference entity conceived of as more stationary [154]. This conceptual
asymmetry is reﬂected as grammatical syndromes within linguistic structure—for example, by the grammatical distinctions
of subject and (indirect) object, by syntactic distinctions between main and subordinate clauses, and by presenting some
entities as presupposed and others as new. All languages have a range of ways of performing this particular placing of
entities of different kinds in relation to one another, both semantically and syntactically, and we draw on this as evidence
for distinguishing the particular ‘semantic conﬁguration’ involved here from others. Grammatical evidence supporting this
in the present case can be found in the kinds of alternations [109] possible (e.g., insertion of ‘there’ as grammatical subject),
nonpossibility for progressive present tenses, of passive and many more that together make up distinctive syndromes of
grammatical consequences (cf. [70]). It is these grammatical consequences that we use as signposts pointing to the seman-
tic distinctions required of the Generalized Upper Model.
The syndrome of grammatical evidence clustered around the present example motivates the deﬁnition of a semantic
entity called a Configuration. Configurations generally correlate with grammatical clauses or other grammatical units express-
ing events or relationships (e.g., nominalizations). Moreover, we can be more speciﬁc in that the particular type of clause
in (7) corresponds to a particular subtype of Configuration, one that we call a SpatialLocating; we will see other subtypes
of Configurations below. This type of semantic conﬁguration has the function of relating some entity (the ﬁgure) to some
speciﬁcation of a place (the ground). The ﬁgure–ground asymmetry also motivates the assignment of distinct roles to the
entities within the conﬁguration: in the present example, the USB drive ﬁlls a locatum relation (the movable object to be
located, or ‘referent’ [110, p. 39]), whereas the place (the ground) ﬁlls a placement relation.
The entity being placed and the place itself can also be distinguished from one another by virtue of distinct syndromes of
grammatical behavior (e.g., most obviously, the former is a simple nominal phrase and the latter is a prepositional phrase).
They are, accordingly, assigned to distinct linguistic-ontological categories within the Generalized Upper Model by drawing
a corresponding high-level distinction between the concepts SimpleThing and Circumstance. This reﬂects the fundamental
distinction between the identity of entities and the location of entities mentioned above (cf. [103,5]). In the example, the
USB drive is a SimpleThing, and to the left of the computer is a further grammatically motivated subconcept of Circumstance,
called a GeneralizedLocation. It is also worth noting here that, similarly to Zwarts [169], we adopt the position that individual
spatial expressions (such as the prepositional phrase at issue here) receive their own individual spatial semantics indepen-
dently of subsequent composition with events or objects—this is important for maintaining compositionality, to which we
return below in Section 5.2.1.
The concept GeneralizedLocation provides a common semantics for any linguistic expression of a ‘place’—including
prepositional phrases, adverbials, nominals and other spatially-relevant constituents when used in appropriate grammat-
ical contexts. Place is therefore understood as a category constructed by the grammar of a language, in our case particularly
English and German (but for other languages too: cf. the references to Talmy, Levinson and others above). In addition, al-
though GeneralizedLocation constructs a place on the basis of some speciﬁed entity, or reference object, it does not do so
directly but rather in terms of the distinct kinds of ‘modes of anchoring and locating’ that language(s) make available; these
we group together under the single concept SpatialModality. Our linguistic ontology provides, again exclusively on the basis
of grammatical evidence, a detailed characterization of the range of subtypes of SpatialModality and their interrelationships
and constraints. We show this at length in the next section.
Formally, we may consider a GeneralizedLocation as a one-place predicate that ‘locates’ its argument. The precise place-
ment of that argument is then constrained by the speciﬁcation of a particular subclass of SpatialModality. This is captured in
an expression of the form:
λx.Loc(x, Pspatial-modality(R))
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where R is the reference object (e.g., the ‘desk’ in ‘in front of the desk’, the ‘tree’ in ‘in the tree’, etc.) and Loc a predicate
of co-location.5 The expression says that some entity x co-locates with some ‘location’ that must be derived from the ref-
erence object R in the manner identiﬁed by the given spatial modality Pspatial-modality . This formalization is then similar to
those proposed by Creary et al. [47] and Bierwisch and Wunderlich [25,164], both of whom argue for a complex composi-
tional structure rather than superﬁcially more straightforward two-place predicates. In our case, however, there will be no
restriction to geometric interpretations of the reference objects for the reasons set out above.
This layer of interpretative indirection is the essential key to achieving an account adequate for the observed ﬂexibility
of linguistic spatial expression usage. Consider, for example, the kind of semantics that must be given for a prepositional
phrase such as ‘at the town hall’ when used in the sentence:
(8) I am waiting at the town hall.
If we proceed directly to a contextualized interpretation of the spatial situation involved, we have a problem. Such a
statement includes both waiting inside the town hall and outside it in the immediate vicinity as possibilities. No single
‘applicability ﬁeld’ or selection of spatial region can be sensibly speciﬁed without considering the context of interpretation
of the utterance. Moreover, as we saw in the examples of the previous section, this has nothing to do with a possible ‘re-
laxation’ or ‘stretching’ of the relevant applicability ﬁeld: the range of application may turn out to be, as in the ‘between’
case illustrated in Fig. 2, totally disjoint. Employing our generic scheme for generalized locations, however, we can give the
semantics of the prepositional phrase of (8) straightforwardly as:
λx.Loc(x, Pproximal(R))
The concept proximal is one of the spatial modalities that we introduce in detail below. The expression as a whole means
that a place is to be derived from the reference object, or relatum as we will now call it in line with general linguistic
practice [19], subject to a constraint of Proximity. That is, the relatum, i.e., the town hall, is used to locate some entity via
the mode of locating/anchoring of ‘being in a proximal relationship to’. Crucially, we take this already to be a functional
characterization, since we cannot express metrically just what is proximal or not—this depends on the purpose of the
interactants—nor over what duration the relation holds, whether the objects involved in a description are moving, and so
on. All that the linguistic statement commits to is that the location is stably proximal ‘for current purposes’, whatever they
might be. We do not at this stage, i.e., within the linguistic semantics, need to talk further of any kind of spatial region
representing this proximity: linguistically, no further commitment is made beyond the claim of functional proximity and it is
this that provides ﬁxed semantic import for all constructions grouped under this particular linguistic-ontological category.6
Within our current example (7), the semantics is constructed similarly. The computer ﬁlls the relatum relation of its
GeneralizedLocation (the more stationary object used for reference), while to the left is the spatial modality that is applied
to the relatum in order to ‘create’ a place; we show the particular position of the spatial modality employed here, to
the left, within the hierarchy of spatial modalities as a whole in Section 4 below. This abstract speciﬁcation of a ‘place’
then ﬁlls the placement role of the SpatialLocating conﬁguration and we arrive at the complete spatial semantics for the
example utterance shown graphically in Fig. 3. In our discussions below, we will use standard Description Logic notation [9]
for deﬁnitions rather than diagrammatic representations because, as set out in detail in Section 4, our linguistic ontology
5 We assume a standard compositional semantics, so for a preposition in a prepositional phrase, for example, the semantics of the phrase would in fact
be the two-place predicate λRλx.Loc(x, Pspatial-modality(R)). The variable for the reference object is bound when the preposition and the prepositional
object are combined within the prepositional phrase (cf. [53]). We omit this phrase-internal detail for the purposes of the current discussion.
6 The issue of what information is required where is an interesting one in its own right and needs to be subjected to empirical experimentation.
Levelt [108], for example, discusses this with respect to perspective choice.
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class–subclass relations and the availability of roles and possible constraints on those roles’ ﬁllers just as we require. The
deﬁnition of SpatialLocating given so far (this will be reﬁned further below) is then as shown in (9).
(9) SpatialLocating ≡ Configuration  ∃locatum.SimpleThing  ∃placement.GeneralizedLocation
Similarly, the concept GeneralizedLocation receives a deﬁnition of the form:
(10) GeneralizedLocation ≡ Circumstance  ∃hasSpatialModality.SpatialModality  ∃relatum.SimpleThing
These deﬁnitions form part of the linguistic ontology’s terminological component (TBox), whereas the particular seman-
tic representations constructed (indicated by the dashed lines in Fig. 3) are part of the assertional component (ABox) or
instantial information. The non-diagrammatic notation we use for the instantial information will be introduced in Section 4.
Instantial representations, which can be derived automatically from the corresponding linguistic utterances (cf. Sec-
tion 5.1), then need to be subjected to contextualization in order to reach a description of possible spatial situations. The
semantic representation itself, however, only serves to constrain that interpretation by capturing the linguistic commitments
entered into by the expression at hand. The area of spatial modalities in which to the left is located (LateralProjections: cf.
Fig. 7), for example, only commits to a decomposition such as that involved in breaking some abstract space into half-planes
formed with respect to a reference entity together with an imposed orientation (e.g., [53]). LeftProjection and RightProjection
are then distinguished as two disjoint extensions of the theory of LateralProjections, anchoring further which of the half-
planes is picked out and the relationships holding between the two. In each case we have a statement of ﬁxed semantic
import, expressed as a minimal abstract spatial ‘theory’. The determination of the abstract spaces involved, the necessary
reference entities, and their orientation then deﬁnes the range of possible interpretative uncertainty to be resolved dur-
ing contextualization. The semantic representation makes the claim that all utterances sharing such a representation will
face the same kinds of uncertainty regardless of how contextualization plays itself out in each particular case. We present
examples of this in Section 5.2 below.
3.2. Example 2: Linguistically distinguished spatial situations
For our second example, we show in more detail how differences can be established between spatial modalities on the
basis of the distinctive patterns revealed by grammatical syndromes. As a starting point, we take Talmy’s suggestion that
we can:
“. . . start with any closed-class spatial morpheme in any language, considering the full schema that it expresses and a
spatial scene that it can apply to” [155].
Talmy illustrates this approach by drawing out the spatial schemas involved in the example:
(11) The board lay across the road.
This is another example of a relation between a ﬁgure and a ground. As before, we can consider this as correlating semanti-
cally with a Configuration involving a located entity (the board) and a generalized location constrained by a spatial modality.
Talmy suggests that the greater part of the schematic structure in this case is conveyed by the closed-class term ‘across’ and,
like other spatial closed-class terms, this expression represents a particular schematic spatial relationship between a (par-
ticular kind of) ﬁgure and a (particular kind of) ground. The question for us, and for the deﬁnition of the spatial modality
component of the linguistic ontology, is just what the nature of that particular relationship is.
Talmy’s method consists of setting out ‘distinguishing scenarios’ that differ minimally from the scenario associated with
usage of the closed-class item across in English but which nevertheless call for the use of a different closed-class item
or grammatical construction. This functions as an investigative probe for revealing those features deemed essential to the
meaning of ‘across’. If any of the features do not hold, or hold differently, then a different linguistic expression is required.
Table 1 shows Talmy’s results. Features (a) and (b) are taken as a starting point while features (c)–(i) are motivated by
what happens linguistically when the corresponding features are violated in the distinguishing scenarios shown on the
right. A similar kind of approach underlies many attempts to provide formal characterizations corresponding more closely
to linguistic usage [8,54], including the development of specially tailored spatial calculi (e.g., [134]).
Talmy’s methodology has been employed for a range of languages, revealing both similarities and differences across
the semantic features those languages construct. But the tests are not exhaustive and can result in over-commitments:
that is, the particular situations described in test sentences can lead to spatial distinctions being imported that are not
linguistically motivated for the terms being investigated. A consideration of grammaticized distinctions is present in Talmy’s
account, but only implicitly. Talmy’s description for ‘across’ is not, for example, an account just of the term ‘across’—what
is actually analyzed is the entire linguistic construction where ‘across’ appears, involving a spatial modality (‘across’), a
spatially-relevant activity (‘lay’) and the particular entities concerned (since both ‘board’ and ‘road’ bring with them spatial
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Features derived from appropriate or inappropriate spatial descriptions for ‘across’ according to Talmy [154]. F = Figure; G = Ground.
target sentence: The board lay across the road. Distinguishing scenario
a. F is spatially related to G
b. G is ribbonal
c. F is linear (and generally bounded at both ends) vs. The wall siding lay over the road.
d. The axes of F and G are roughly perpendicular vs. The board lay along the road.
e. F is parallel to the plane of G vs. The board is sticking out of/into the road.
f. F is adjacent to the plane of G vs. The board lay (buried) in the road/
The board was suspended above the road.
g. F’s length is at least as great as G’s width vs. The baguette lay on the road.
h. F touches both of G’s edges vs. The board lay over one edge of the road.
i. The axis of F is horizontal (the plane of G is typically, but not necessarily,
horizontal)/The spear hung across the wall.
vs. The spear hung up and down on the wall.
commitments). The description and motivation that Talmy offers of this method is then still, from our perspective, centred
too narrowly on individual items rather than on what the grammatical organization and corresponding constructions as a
whole commit to.
To show this more clearly we begin by noting that the semantics of ‘across’ as characterized by Talmy presupposes
several features that are only partially due to the contribution of ‘across’. As a case in point, Talmy proposes that ‘across’
is only appropriate due to the ‘ribbonal’ nature of the entity playing the role of ground: here, the road. But Talmy himself
provides a further example in which the ground is not ‘ribbonal’ in the described sense (case (i)):
(12) The spear hung across the wall.
and, in fact, it is easy to ﬁnd further counterexamples, such as “the bridge across the lake” which does not presuppose the
form of the lake to be ribbonal. It seems more likely that the association of being ‘ribbonal’ is due to our world knowledge
of those entities with which ‘across’ co-occurs, and so conceptualized information is again confused with the linguistic
semantic contribution.
Within the Generalized Upper Model, we characterize the spatial semantics that appears to be involved in usages of
‘across’ in the intended sense by deﬁning a particular spatial modality, that of PathRepresentingInternal. This modality con-
structs a ‘place’ by construing some path that is internal to another entity, given as the spatial modality’s relatum, in the
sense of ‘lying within its borders’. Moreover, it is suﬃcient here to lie within the borders when the path is projected into
the plane of the relatum rather than being strictly inside in terms of three-dimensional containment. The relatum then
needs to be seen as (at least) 2-dimensional since 1-dimensional entities do not give rise to insides.
For this and similar reasons, GUM is also forced to draw a high level distinction between points (0 D) vs. lines and planes
(1 to 2 D). This plays a role for the categorization of several spatial modalities, including both the present example and
spatial modalities such as Distribution, which implies a complex (at least 1-dimensional) relatum. This latter modality is used
in some conﬁgurations involving ‘across’ explicitly excluded from consideration in Talmy’s example, as in the distributed
meaning of ‘across’ in expressions such as “all across the country”. In the present case, the entailed 2-dimensionality is
consistent with a linguistic construal of the road as 2-dimensional.7 Putting this together, Talmy’s ﬁnding that the ﬁgure
needs to be one-dimensional is captured by the notion of ‘path’, while the ground needing to be planar is captured by the
spatial modality being internal.
This contrasts with what happens when we take other spatial modalities: for example that corresponding with ‘around’
in phrases such as “the road around the lake”. ‘Around’ is similar to ‘across’ in that some relatum is used to construct a
‘path-like’ place that locates the ﬁgure; however, it is also different in that the relationship is not necessarily internal to the
relatum, although it might be, as seen in “He swam around the lake”. As a consequence, we can only state that ‘around’
is PathRepresenting but the precise subcategory of PathRepresenting relevant for a particular usage is a pragmatic discourse
inference made in connection with the relatum and the activity. Many prepositions (at least in English) under-commit in
this way. These phenomena are captured by deﬁning a more general category of PathRepresenting that is divided into two
more speciﬁc categories, PathRepresentingInternal and PathRepresentingExternal; i.e.:
PathRepresenting ≡ PathRepresentingInternal unionsq PathRepresentingExternal
Returning to our example, Talmy also suggests that some notion of adjacency must be involved since the board can be
neither within the road nor somewhere above it. But this again involves several over-commitments. The observation is more
appropriately accounted for by representing ‘across’ as committing only to the two-dimensional (topological) relationship
(i.e., projecting the path into the plane of the relatum). It is then simply not possible to infer any internal relationship in
the third dimension. As seen by “the bridge across the lake”, the term ‘across’ as such can easily be used while violating
7 More precisely, this means that the sentence introduces a discourse reference object into the unfolding semantics of the text/dialogue that is construed
semantically as 2-dimensional and which is used to refer to and classify some entity as a ‘road’.
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‘across’ and ‘over’, where adjacency is clearly not entailed, are interchangeable in context:
(13) a. The shop is over/across the street.
b. The bridge goes over/across the street.
c. The man walks over/across the street.
In the present example, the adjacency component is actually contributed by the meaning of ‘lay’ rather than ‘across’, again
showing that it is necessary to be sensitive to the entire grammatical construction when considering interpretations.
Talmy’s characterization of ‘across’ in terms of boundaries is also problematic: it is claimed that the ﬁgure needs to touch
both edges of the ground. However, unlike formal geometric or topological considerations of space and regions, language
does not rely on boundaries in this strict way. Instead, what is linguistically relevant here is the notion of covering the
extension of the ground functionally: the board covers the full width of the road for some purpose. This generally remains
the case even if it is somewhat shorter or considerably longer than the road’s extension. As soon as this sentence is set into
a functional context, the exact topological relationship becomes irrelevant: a person could use the board (lying across the
road) as a bridge over the muddy road even if a considerable piece was missing; this would not necessitate an expression
like “the board lay over one edge of the road” (suggested by Talmy under case (h)) unless it became functionally relevant in
the given context. Similarly, bridges are regularly built across rivers without touching edges or boundaries. Thus, touching
the edges as such cannot be crucial to the linguistic semantics. Instead, the notion of functionally covering the full extent
is the linguistically relevant characterization that needs to be captured as part of the shallow semantics of space. The
concept PathRepresentingInternal represents this since it construes its path as being limited (functionally) by some entity’s
boundaries. In contrast, realizations of PathRepresentingExternal do not necessarily involve full coverage, since paths may
follow the outward shape of an entity for a limited extent.
‘Across’ also appears, as Talmy points out, to convey a particular relationship between the shape of the ground and the
trajectory of the ﬁgure that Talmy characterizes as perpendicularity concerning the axes (case (d)). This must also be seen func-
tionally since it is largely inferable from what it means to get ‘across’ an entity at all: i.e., a connection is made between one
side of the relatum and another. The notion of perpendicularity at issue here is again therefore based on functional concerns
rather than geometry. Some items, for example ‘through’, which can also serve as a realization of PathRepresentingInternal
(since some ‘path-like’ place is created within the speciﬁed relatum), do not relate to perpendicularity (as in ‘he walked
through the crowd’); other items, for example ‘over’, may be used in both perpendicular and non-perpendicular contexts. For
example: in “the bridge leads over the street”, the bridge (as ﬁgure) is functionally perpendicular to the street (as ground),
whereas in “walking over the bridge”, the trajectory of the path (as ﬁgure) is topologically parallel to the bridge’s linear
extension (as ground).8
Many of the spatial notions that we can identify here are also related to construals of speciﬁcally constrained topological
shapes for the ground. In the case of ‘across’, this concerns functional perpendicularity (as a notion speciﬁc to ‘crossing’) and
coverage of the full extent (as a notion associated with the concept PathRepresentingInternal, encompassing several lexical
realizations); Talmy’s parallelness in the plane is also captured in this way, since adhering to the ground’s topological contour
is conceptualized as taking place in the plane. These properties provide further evidence for class–subclass relationships
among the spatial modalities. In particular, the Generalized Upper Model makes the concept PathRepresenting a subconcept
of the modality ShapeCommitting, indicating that the referent object (i.e., relatum or ground) has a determining effect for
the shape of the ‘place’ that is constructed:
PathRepresenting  ShapeCommitting
This dependence can vary from a quite speciﬁc determination (as in ‘following a path’ where the shape of the path is
entirely responsible for the shape of the place constructed) to more generic determinations, such as that involved in getting
from one side of the relatum to another side (as in ‘across the lake’). In the latter case, the shape is only constrained to be
topologically bounded by ‘opposed’ sides that can be crossed between.
3.3. Conclusion
In this section, we have set out how we employ grammatical evidence in order both to motivate particular categories
within our linguistic ontology and to articulate further the relationships and dependencies between these categories. We
believe that the kind of approach proposed by Talmy brings out a rich collection of semantic features for consideration
within an adequate semantics, but it is nevertheless striking that the restricted range of grammatical evidence that he
draws upon reduces the accuracy and generality of the claims that can be made. The more semantic constraints we can
motivate directly from patterns of linguistic usage, the more accurate our semantic formulation can become and the better
we will be able to constrain interpretations of spatial terms according to the discourse purpose and the spatial situation.
8 Note, that there are topologically parallel relations that, when put into a real context, will not comply with a “walking over the bridge” scenario. Here,
however, the examples only map from a linguistic description to certain topological constraints, not vice versa.
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cess to the grammatical evidence available. A prepositional phrase such as ‘across the road’ cannot be considered in isolation
because alone it represents an overly impoverished source of evidence. Such abbreviated starting points invite interpreters
to ‘guess’ intended interpretations, which is a process subject to such broad variation as to be inherently problematic; this
becomes even worse if we consider, for example, individual prepositions. Bringing in grammatical sources of evidence as we
propose so as to consider entire constructional contexts (e.g., the clauses through which particular usages are expressed)
allows us to go further than looking at particular lexicalizations while still constraining the range of interpretations that are
considered eligible. This is seen as an essential pre-condition for bringing out the similarities and differences necessary for
an accurate semantics.
Although space precludes giving the same level of detail for each category we discuss in this paper, in the development
of the Generalized Upper Model linguistic ontology to which we now turn, we always base distinctions on as broad a
range of grammatically complete examples as possible. Moreover, since we consider it unlikely that arbitrarily constructed
examples provide suﬃcient variation to build upon, this also moves our method further towards empirical, corpus-based
studies. This is brought out subsequently as one of the main criteria for evaluation we employ in Section 6 below.
4. The linguistically-motivated ontological structure of spatial categories and relations
We have now motivated a linguistic ontology for mediating between linguistic form and contextualized interpretation
(Section 2) and sketched in what way grammatical evidence is taken as the principal guide to that linguistic ontology’s
content and organization (Section 3). In this section we turn to the main results, the linguistic ontology itself. In particular,
we set out in detail the spatial extension we have developed for the Generalized Upper Model linguistic ontology, showing
how all of the categories discussed so far ﬁt together within a comprehensive account of the linguistic semantics of space.
The spatial extension of GUM is a formal theory axiomatized in description logic (DL [9]), a decidable fragment of
ﬁrst-order logic (FOL). Using DL provides a structural backbone based on the class–subclass relationship (the ‘signature’ of
the theory) and the usual description logic possibilities for deﬁning roles between classes and constraints on those roles’
ﬁllers. GUM’s signature therefore contains categories (unary predicates), also called classes or concepts, and relations (binary
predicates); speciﬁc kinds of relationships are deﬁned as relations between classes, which are themselves organized within
a relation hierarchy.9 The GUM ontology itself is formulated in the Web Ontology Language OWL 2.010 and is freely available
(licensed under creative commons).11 We employ both DL and OWL primarily because this guarantees the broad technical
applicability of the ontology in diverse contexts of use, including natural language processing tools and dialogue systems,
where DL, and now increasingly OWL, are established standards. We do not claim that the semantics of spatial language
makes particular demands on expressivity that allow that semantics to be situated within one particular class of description
logic rather than another, although this would be an interesting path to explore. Moreover, as the spatial extension of GUM
is intended for use within running dialogue systems, our aim has been to keep the ontology within a decidable logic as
far as possible. The classes making up the class–subclass backbone and the roles deﬁned over these classes are motivated
throughout by distinguishable grammatical syndromes of the kind suggested in the previous sections. Standing ‘behind’ the
concepts of the spatial extension backbone, we envisage modular ‘spatial theories’, represented as formal speciﬁcations, that
capture the minimal semantic commitments entered into by each class (cf. [19,80] and Section 5.2); in this section, however,
we focus on the backbone.
The most general distinctions within the GUM concept hierarchy partition the top node, GUMThing, into three basic
subcategories: Configuration, Element and MultiConfiguration. These categories represent three distinct scales of semantic com-
plexity for entities, related in various ways to one another as we shall see below. A Configuration in GUM is, as described
informally above, the semantic correlate of some activity or state of affairs, i.e., some representation of experience [18].
The semantics of simple clauses therefore corresponds, in general, to Configurations and the description offered by GUM is
most closely related to event-based representations in linguistics drawing on a Neo-Davidsonian linguistic semantics [49].
Combinations of clauses correspond to MultiConfigurations—these are speciﬁed as semantic dependency structures holding
over conﬁgurations.
Subtypes of Configurations deﬁne distinctive sets of relations which typically take Elements as their ﬁllers. These relations
then capture the different ways in which Elements can participate in events, activities, or states. Exactly one of those
elements has to stand in the relation processInConfiguration and is restricted to be a particular subtype of Element called
a Process. Processes are most commonly expressed linguistically by verbal groups [71]. Further participants in the state of
affairs are related in conﬁguration-speciﬁc ways to the Configuration as a whole and deﬁne those semantic elements which
are necessarily entailed by the kind of conﬁguration occurring: e.g., a ‘running’ state of affairs can only exist together with
something that ‘runs’, etc. Additional information concerning when, where, how, or under which conditions some state
of affairs occurs is provided by a further subtype of Element called Circumstance, related to the conﬁguration by a small
9 Throughout this paper we use ‘category’, ‘concept’, ‘class’, ‘type’, etc. as synonyms, reﬂecting the fact that several different traditions are being combined
in the discussion and DLs do not distinguish these formally in any case; similarly for ‘relation’, ‘role’, ‘feature’, ‘property’, ‘attribute’, etc.
10 http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-syntax.
11 http://www.ontospace.uni-bremen.de/ontology/stable/GUM-3-space.owl.
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number of conﬁguration-independent relations. The basic deﬁnition of a Configuration, given again in standard Description
Logic notation [9], is then:
(14) Configuration ≡ GUMThing  ∃processInConfiguration.Process
i.e., any conﬁguration is a subclass of GUMThing and necessarily has a role processInConfiguration ﬁlled by a Process. In
addition, subclasses of conﬁgurations deﬁne further participantInConfiguration and circumstanceInConfiguration relations, ﬁlled
by SimpleThings and Circumstances respectively; we omit a formal speciﬁcation here. These distinctions are, as always,
demanded by distinctions made linguistically: semantic participants often correlate with obligatory grammatical elements,
and circumstances with optional ones (cf. [71]). Both of them, however, can be expressed by nominal groups, adverbial
groups and prepositional phrases.
Within English, German, and many other languages there is strong evidence for several immediate subcategories of
Configuration (cf. [70]). Within GUM we adopt the following three disjoint Configuration subconcepts: BeingAndHaving,
DoingAndHappening, and SayingAndSensing. BeingAndHaving conﬁgurations describe statements of existence and static rela-
tions between participants, DoingAndHappening conﬁgurations describe intentional actions and non-intentional happenings,
and SayingAndSensing conﬁgurations represent cognitive and verbal acts. As we are addressing the linguistic-ontological
structure of spatial language here, we will focus on those conﬁgurations, elements, and relations involved in the representa-
tion of spatial semantics. The ﬁrst few steps in the conﬁguration sub-hierarchy leading down to spatially-relevant categories
are shown in Fig. 4. Again, these broad conﬁguration classes are all distinguished by differing grammatical behavior. As
noted above, we will not always have the space to present this grammatical evidence explicitly and so it is important to
recall that no distinctions are introduced into GUM without linguistic grounding regardless of whether we explicitly show that
grounding here. Moreover, although we sometimes employ simpliﬁed constructed examples to illustrate concepts, our main
evidence is naturally occurring corpus or experimental data. All of the distinctions are therefore motivated from linguistic
phenomena as set out in the discussion of the previous sections.
We have already seen one particular case of a Configuration that involved spatial semantics: both the main examples
of Section 3, i.e., (7) and (11), were assigned to the semantic class SpatialLocating. The position of this class in relation to
other GUM conﬁgurations can be seen in Fig. 4, where we see several further subconcepts lying between SpatialLocating
and Configuration; we describe those that are spatially relevant below. Several other branches in the Configuration hierarchy
also contain spatially-relevant conﬁgurations; alongside SpatialLocating two other conﬁgurations are particularly relevant:
(i) NonAffectingSpatialDoing: dynamic spatial conﬁgurations, in which an entity is changing its relative position (such as
motion or orientation);
(ii) AffectingSpatialDoing: dynamic spatial conﬁgurations, in which an entity affects the relative position of another entity
(such as motion or orientation).
These are both subconcepts of the main conﬁguration type DoingAndHappening and so correlate with very different gram-
matical phenomena to those of the concept SpatialLocating, a subconcept of the main class BeingAndHaving.
The inter-connections between these distinct types of conﬁgurations and the many subclasses of spatial modalities will
become quite detailed as we proceed. Fig. 5 therefore gives a graphic representation of the general structure of types of
classes and relations in GUM relevant for specifying the semantics of spatial language as a road map of what is to come.
In this style of representation, adopted from the documentation of the DOLCE foundational ontology [119], classes are
represented as boxes and class–subclass relationships are shown by spatial inclusion (i.e., boxes within boxes). The relations
between classes are indicated by directed gray arrows. Taking the lowest two relations in the center of the ﬁgure, for
example, we can read off the diagram that the relation actor is a relation between a SimpleThing (which is a subclass of
Element) and DoingAndHappening (which is a subclass of Configuration), while actee is a relation between SimpleThing and
AffectingAction (which is one of the two main subclasses of DoingAndHappening). We refer back to this diagram at many
points in the discussion below.
Our overview of the GUM linguistic ontology is structured as follows. First we provide a more complete description of
the SpatialLocating conﬁgurations that we have seen and used in our examples above (Section 4.1). Then we look at non-
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affecting and affecting dynamic conﬁgurations (Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively). Following this, we set out the distinct
kinds of spatial elements used in these conﬁgurations, namely: GeneralizedLocation and an extended kind of ‘place’, called
a GeneralizedRoute (Section 4.4), then the SpatialModalities themselves (Section 4.5), and ﬁnally those SimpleThings that
exhibit particularly spatial aspects (Section 4.6).
4.1. Static spatial conﬁgurations and their elements
In English, German, and many other languages, there is a broad class of clausal constructions distinguished by distinctive
syndromes of grammatical properties that may be termed ‘relational’ (cf. [71]). These bring together entities and attributes
of those entities. In regular, non-spatial relational expressions, such as “The book is old”, attributes (e.g., “old”) are assigned
to entities (e.g., “book”) by the GUM conﬁguration of Relating, a subconcept of BeingAndHaving. Within the Relating conﬁgu-
ration and all its subtypes, the entity and the attributes are distinguished by differing relations: the GUM relation hierarchy
speciﬁes the relation domain for the entity and the relation attribute for the attribute.
Proceeding downward in the conﬁguration hierarchy below Relating (cf. Fig. 4) is the concept Circumstantial; conﬁgura-
tions of this type relate an entity to some attribute of cause, reason, purpose, or other circumstance-like attribute, including
those involving space and time. For these latter circumstances, we have a further particular subtype of Circumstantial, a
GeneralizedLocating. For conﬁgurations of this type, the required relation domain is further speciﬁed in the relation hierar-
chy to be the subrelation locatum, corresponding as we have seen above to the ‘located entity’.
GeneralizedLocatings cover both spatial and temporal locatings. A conﬁguration deﬁning only a spatial relation is then a
SpatialLocating, while a conﬁguration deﬁning only a temporal relation is a TemporalLocating. Focusing on the SpatialLocating
case, the inherited attribute relation is further speciﬁed to be a placement relation; this allows the conﬁguration to specify the
place where the entity is being positioned; we showed in Fig. 3 above how this conﬁguration is structured internally. The
ﬁller of the placement is in fact restricted to be one of two subtypes of Element, however: either it is a GeneralizedLocation,
as seen in our ﬁrst examples, or it is a GeneralizedRoute. We describe GeneralizedRoutes in more detail below; for the
present we note that it is equally possible to specify a place in terms of a single location (“the dog is in the park”) and as
an ‘extended’ place (“the road runs from Bremen to Hamburg”). The grammatical behavior of the clause construction in this
latter case is far closer to the ﬁrst example than it is to a motion event and so we capture this within GUM by allocating
them to the same conﬁguration, i.e., a SpatialLocating; the internal behavior of places and routes is, however, different and
so they are distinguished within GUM. GeneralizedRoutes may specify start, intermediate, and end points of the ‘route’ [50]
and that route may then be speciﬁed by both actions and attributions of spatial extent. Jackendoff [86] and others propose
that humans distinguish conceptually as well as linguistically between places and paths and the GeneralizedLocation vs.
GeneralizedRoute distinction reﬂects this. We gave a preliminary deﬁnition of SpatialLocating in (9) in Section 3 above; now
we reﬁne the deﬁnition to ﬁt with the GUM hierarchy in full:
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The deﬁnition we gave for GeneralizedLocation (10) is unchanged; we repeat it here for ease of reference:
GeneralizedLocation ≡ Circumstance  ∃hasSpatialModality.SpatialModality  ∃relatum.SimpleThing
As observed above, although the relatum relation is necessarily present, it is often left unspeciﬁed in natural discourse [157]
and so must be ﬁlled in during contextualization.
The GeneralizedLocation binds together a relatum and a spatial relationship within a single structured entity that may
stand in a placement relation within a spatial conﬁguration. An encapsulation of this kind has been argued better to support
compositionality (cf., e.g., [47,168]) and also allows various combinations of multiple locations to be expressed within single
conﬁgurations, as in the example “The plant is in the corner, by the window, next to the chair”, in which one SpatialLocating
deﬁnes three placements. This becomes even more important when, as described below, placements are modiﬁed by ex-
pressing spatial perspectives, spatial accessibility, as well as extensions or enhancements of the spatial relation. For example,
the utterance “The plant is to the front left of the chair, right here in the corner” combines two relations (front and left)
with respect to one relatum (the chair), while “in the corner” is enhanced with possible access information “right here”.
Modiﬁcations contained within single encapsulated ‘places’ are easier to track when they are re-used across spatial place-
ments in a dialogue [47]. This is a further motivation for deﬁning GeneralizedLocations so that they retain their structure
independently of the conﬁgurations in which they are used. Thus we ﬁnd the ‘same’ GeneralizedLocation at work in the
conﬁgurations corresponding to “he goes to the right of the chair” (dynamic spatial conﬁguration) and “he is standing to
the right of the chair” (static spatial conﬁguration)—the difference being captured, as we will see below, in terms of two
distinct modes of participation in their conﬁgurations: i.e., direction (cf. (18)) and placement (cf. (15)) respectively. We can
also now combine these deﬁnitions and show how particular spatial statements are represented. For this we adopt a further
standard notation used for description logic assertional, or instance information, that of the Manchester syntax for OWL
2.0.12 Using the classes and relations deﬁned within GUM, the clause “The USB drive is on the table” receives the semantics
shown in (16), consisting of two related instances, or ‘individuals’.
(16) Individual: SL-of-USB Individual: GL-of-USB
Types: SpatialLocating Types: GeneralizedLocation
Facts: locatum The USB drive Facts: relatum Table
placementGL-of-USB hasSpatialModality Support
All instance names (shown in slanted font) appearing here and in similar expressions used in this paper are to be read
strictly as placeholders or semantic variables—that is, they do not indicate any hidden lexical or syntactic information;
we will also regularly omit non-spatial information. Although we will return to this point again in Section 5.1 below, it is
nevertheless worth emphasizing here that this kind of assertional speciﬁcation is generally to be derived automatically using
computational analysis grammars, drawing on the close connection between linguistic forms and semantic speciﬁcation
guaranteed by our reliance on grammatical syndromes when constructing the ontology in the ﬁrst place.13
Finally, spatial location descriptions can also occur together with temporal speciﬁcations. This may happen in two ways:
either both pieces of information are linguistically presented as equal, or the temporal information is added to the spatial
location information. As an example of the former case, the sentence “The meeting is in the city center at eight o’clock”
can be split linguistically into spatial and temporal components, as in “The meeting is in the city center and the meeting
is at eight o’clock”. Therefore, the spatial and the temporal entities are of equal status and the sentence is a realization of
the conﬁguration SpatialTemporalLocating (cf. Fig. 4). An example of the latter case is: “He was in the city center at eight
o’clock”; this sentence cannot be split into “*He was in the city center and he was at eight o’clock”, showing grammatically
that the temporal component depends on, or further modiﬁes, the attribution of spatial information. This sentence is then
a straightforward realization of SpatialLocating with additional circumstantial temporal information.
The two sentences also differ with respect to the kind of entity being talked about, i.e., that which ﬁlls the locatum
relation inherited from GeneralizedLocating. In a SpatialTemporalLocating, the locatum must be an event; whereas a
SpatialLocating does not require any speciﬁc kind of locatum, i.e., it may be a person, an object, an event, etc. This dis-
tinction reﬂects the syndrome that events are linguistically construed as spatiotemporal entities; they can be referred to
either in terms of their spatial or in terms of their temporal attributes. Persons and objects also exist in time and space, but
English and German do not construe them temporally: “*He was on Monday.”
12 http://www.w3.org/2007/OWL/wiki/ManchesterSyntax.
13 Note that this property also has consequences for evaluation. For example, when our ontology assigns a linguistic structure to an ontological partition,
one can predict corresponding grammatical alternations for this structure, particular semantic entailments, as well as possibilities for contextualization, all
of which can be tested.
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With actions or events such as “I ran” or “the ball rolled” either the state of affairs is construed linguistically as an
actor intentionally performing an action or as an unintentional event occurring. Such conﬁgurations are often expressed by
intransitive verbs or, if transitive, the object is not affected or created by the action or event but serves instead to restrict
or further deﬁne the type of action in question—as in “I play tennis” [70]. Within GUM, such conﬁgurations are speciﬁed as
NonAffectingActions, a subconcept of DoingAndHappening (cf. Fig. 4). These require one additional obligatory participant, the
actor, for the entity who performs the action or who initiates the event; the respective dependencies can be seen in Fig. 5.
NonAffectingActions are themselves subdivided into conﬁgurations that represent either actions or events. Conﬁgurations
representing actions have one spatially relevant subconcept, NonAffectingSpatialDoing, in which an actor performs a spatial
action. Such actions may be associated with spatial direction terms that express a particular orientation or movement in a
speciﬁc direction [160]. Accordingly, there are two subclasses of this concept:
(i) NonAffectingOrienting, which deﬁnes a spatially oriented relation of the actor, for instance “We are facing the table”. Here
we have a GeneralizedLocation as usual, but in this case it ﬁlls the conﬁguration-speciﬁc relation orientationDirection.
(ii) NonAffectingMotion, which deﬁnes a spatial movement of the actor, for instance “He is walking towards the table”.
Movements are the more complex of the two and can be expressed by directed motions, re-orientations, or under-speciﬁed
movements of the actor. The category NonAffectingMotion is accordingly divided into three subclasses:
(17) NonAffectingMotion ≡ NonAffectingDirectedMotion unionsq NonAffectingOrientationChange
unionsq NonAffectingSimpleMotion
In NonAffectingDirectedMotions, the direction of motion can be expressed in different ways. For example, if a direction is
speciﬁed without a speciﬁc goal, the direction depends only on the actor, as in “He walks forward” or “He goes upward”. The
GeneralizedLocations here ﬁll a conﬁguration-speciﬁc relation motionDirection and cannot freely deﬁne an additional relatum;
it is the position of the actor which determines the interpretations possible for ‘forward’, ‘upward’, etc. Alternatively, if the
direction is expressed with speciﬁc entities, as in ‘along the road’, the conﬁguration deﬁnes the relation route. The deﬁnition
of NonAffectingDirectedMotion is then as follows:
(18) NonAffectingDirectedMotion ≡ NonAffectingMotion
 (∃direction.GeneralizedLocation unionsq ∃route.GeneralizedRoute)
GeneralizedRoutes can deﬁne the relations source, pathPlacement, pathIndication, and destination for their route compo-
nents, and these in turn are ﬁlled by GeneralizedLocations; we will see the deﬁnition in detail below. The instantial
semantics shown in (19) gives an example of a speciﬁcation that deﬁnes the start and end point of a route in a
NonAffectingDirectedMotion. This is the GUM speciﬁcation corresponding to the expression “The deer ran from the hill to
the stream.”
(19) Individual: NADM
Types: NonAffectingDirectedMotion Individual: GLsource
Facts: actor Deer Types: GeneralizedLocation
processInConfiguration running Facts: relatum Hill
route GenRoute hasSpatialModality GeneralDirectionalDistancing
Individual: GenRoute Individual: GLdest
Types: GeneralizedRoute Types: GeneralizedLocation
Facts: source GLsource Facts: relatum Stream
destination GLdest hasSpatialModality GeneralDirectionalNearing
Motions that do not involve a change of location but only a change of orientation are speciﬁed by the conﬁguration
NonAffectingOrientationChange. The direction of the orientation is deﬁned by the relation orientationDirection, which can be
expressed by a directional term, such as “The wheel rotates to the right”, or by a reference object together with a spatial
relation, such as “He curves toward the jars”. NonAffectingOrientationChanges can also deﬁne sources and destinations, given
by a route, in which case the direction can be expressed with several segments, such as “turn from the kitchen (90◦ to the
left) to the oﬃce”. Here both the GeneralizedLocations “from the kitchen” and “to the oﬃce” are deﬁned as the source and
destination in a GeneralizedRoute since they can also indicate start and end points of a directed motion; intermediate places
within a turn, however, appear to be rare. The resulting deﬁnition is given in (20).
(20) NonAffectingOrientationChange
≡ NonAffectingMotion
 (∃orientationDirection.GeneralizedLocation unionsq ∃orientationRoute.GeneralizedRoute)
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tion. Examples for this category are “He is wiggling up and down” or “He is dancing around”. The relation placement is then
speciﬁed for the places expressing where the action takes place; e.g. “He is dancing around in the street”.
4.3. Affecting dynamic spatial conﬁgurations
In expressions of actions or events such as “They are assembling the engine” or “The drink was placed on the table
before him”, an actor either creates or affects an entity. In GUM, such expressions are represented by the conﬁguration
AffectingAction, a further subconcept of DoingAndHappening. It inherits the relation actor for the actor and deﬁnes the addi-
tional relation actee for the affected entity (cf. Fig. 5); i.e.:
(21) AffectingAction ≡ DoingAndHappening  ∃actee.SimpleThing
AffectingActions either create an entity that did not exist before the action, represented by the subconcept CreativeMaterial-
Action, or they affect (for instance change, manipulate, or destroy) an entity that is construed as existing, represented by the
subconcept DispositiveMaterialAction (cf. [70]).
For the GUM spatial extension, a necessary subconcept of DispositiveMaterialAction is AffectingSpatialAction, a conﬁguration
that deﬁnes an action in which an entity is spatially affected by an actor. In general, the actor changes the location or ori-
entation of the actee. Similarly to NonAffectingSpatialDoing, AffectingSpatialAction has two subconcepts, i.e., AffectingOrienting
and AffectingMotion (see Fig. 4). Apart from deﬁning the relation actee, their deﬁnitions correspond to those of non-affecting
orienting and motion conﬁgurations respectively. This correspondence also holds for the subconcepts of AffectingMotion,
yielding the corresponding subconcepts: AffectingDirectedMotion, AffectingOrientationChange and AffectingSimpleMotion. An ex-
ample of an AffectingDirectedMotion, “He puts the USB drive on the table”, is given in (22); here, the “USB drive” is the actee
spatially manipulated by the actor.
(22) Individual: ADM Individual: GenRoute
Types: AffectingDirectedMotion Types: GeneralizedRoute
Facts: actor He Facts: destination GLdest
actee USB drive Individual: GLdest
processInConfiguration putting Types: GeneralizedLocation
route GenRoute Facts: relatum Table
hasSpatialModality Support
The actor in AffectingSpatialActions may also remain unspeciﬁed in the linguistic form. This often occurs in passive con-
structions, such as “The cupboard was moved to the wall”, or in ‘middle’ constructions, such as “The cupboard goes over
there”.
4.4. Spatial elements I: GeneralizedLocation and GeneralizedRoute
Although static and dynamic descriptions clearly exhibit some fundamental conceptual differences [123], the way in
which language construes static and dynamic situations shows many points of overlap. In English for example, it is not
possible without further grammatical context to state whether ‘across the street’ is static or dynamic. Static contexts involve
a ﬁgure and a ground construed linguistically as two currently immobile entities that are spatially related to one another in
a particular way deﬁned by the spatial modality. Dynamic contexts may involve the same spatial schema but in these cases
the ﬁgure is not an immobile entity but rather the trajectory covered by some entity. There are also intermediate forms
in which the entities involved are static, yet there is an entailed trajectory that licenses the spatial term, as in “The shop
across the road”, which is motivated by the necessity of crossing the road in order to reach the shop.
In all these cases, it is the grammatical syndromes of the clauses as a whole that provide distinguishing information.
GUM therefore represents, as mentioned above, elements that can occur in both static and dynamic conﬁgurations in the
same way. Dynamic descriptions can, however, give more spatial information than static descriptions: for example, they
can specify a path, a starting point or an end point of an action. Our formalization reﬂects this, ﬁrst, by distinguishing
GeneralizedLocations from GeneralizedRoutes as indicated above and, second, by providing more attributes for dynamic
conﬁgurations than for static conﬁgurations.
As already shown, GeneralizedLocations describe relative positions of entities and ﬁll a variety of relations, such as a
placement of a static location, a direction of a directed movement, an orientationDirection of an orientation change motion, or
a motionDirection in a directed motion. They are also used to specify parts of a route, resulting in the following deﬁnition
for the category GeneralizedRoute:
(23) GeneralizedRoute ≡ Circumstance
 (=1 source.GeneralizedLocation
unionsq =1 destination.GeneralizedLocation
unionsq 1 pathPlacement.GeneralizedPathLocation
unionsq 1 pathIndication.GeneralizedPathLocation)
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specify intermediate points. These relations are each ﬁlled by a GeneralizedPathLocation, a further subconcept of
GeneralizedLocation that adds in the possibility of building up chains of connected locations serving as route segments.
Placements and indications of paths are distinguished according to the way the path is described. A pathPlacement is
deﬁned when the relatum is linguistically construed in 1, 2, or 3 dimensions and locates the path itself; examples of path
placements are “along the river”, “down the corridor” or “through the tunnel”. A pathIndication is deﬁned when the relatum
is linguistically construed in zero dimensions and gives a single point constraining where the path may lie; examples
of path indications are “by the tree”, “past the fence”, etc. When a GeneralizedRoute is related to an orientation change
conﬁguration, however, neither pathIndication nor pathPlacement can be deﬁned; this reﬂects the effects of the distinctions
in the dimensionality of entities discussed in previous sections.
The instantial semantics shown in (24) gives an example of a more complex speciﬁcation combining locations and
generalized routes. This extends the example given as (19) above, showing the GUM speciﬁcation corresponding to the
expression “The deer ran from the hill down the road by the old tree to the stream.”14
(24) Individual: NADM
Types: NonAffectingDirectedMotion Individual: GLsource
Facts: actor Deer Types: GeneralizedLocation
processInConfiguration running Facts: relatum Hill
route GenRoute hasSpatialModality GeneralDirectionalDistancing
Individual: GenRoute Individual: GLpathP
Types: GeneralizedRoute Types: GeneralizedPathLocation
Facts: source GLsource Facts: relatum Road
pathPlacement GLpathP hasSpatialModality PathRepresentingInternal
pathIndication GLpathI Individual: GLpathI
destination GLdest Types: GeneralizedPathLocation
Facts: relatum OldTree
hasSpatialModality Proximal
Individual: GLdest
Types: GeneralizedLocation
Facts: relatum Stream
hasSpatialModality GeneralDirectionalNearing
Whereas the route parts in this example co-describe the route given, it is also possible to construct a route out of
a sequence of route segments so that one segment is understood to follow another. The grammatical evidence for these
distinctions is complex and builds on the differing ordering possibilities and preposition choices available for the distinct
types. An example of such an expression is “along the river, over the bridge, past the fence and down the road”. Here, the
whole path is represented by a GeneralizedRoute, specifying the ﬁrst placement “along the river” by a pathPlacement ﬁlled
by a GeneralizedPathLocation. This element then deﬁnes not only the spatial modality (“along”) and the relatum (“the river”)
but also a further relation nextPathPlacement, which is itself ﬁlled by another GeneralizedPathLocation representing “over
the bridge”. GeneralizedPathLocations not only inherit the relations hasSpatialModality and relatum from GeneralizedLocation,
but also specify a successor relationship for positioning route segments within an ordered list of pathPlacements or
pathIndications. Two successor relations are distinguished for this: nextPathPlacement and nextPathIndication, according to
the type of route segment following.15
One last subconcept of GeneralizedLocation is GeneralizedComplexLocation. This element represents a location requiring a
particular kind of ‘complex’ relatum for constructing a place. Such complex entities either consist of more than one element,
i.e., they are linguistically expressed as plurals, for instance “He went between the objects”, or are themselves subconcepts of
the GUM category DecomposableObject, for instance “He stood among the crowd”. GeneralizedComplexLocations can, as with
all GeneralizedLocations, be used in both static or dynamic spatial conﬁgurations but select particular spatial modalities: in
particular, subclasses of the spatial modality Distribution (see Section 4.5).
Finally, all GeneralizedLocations may additionally specify the following relations:
– accessibility, when some kind of speciﬁc access between the locatum or actor/actee and the GeneralizedLocation is ex-
pressed; this accessibility might be high or low, as in “I am here” vs. “I am there”.
– reciprocality, when a spatial reciprocal relationship between the locatum or actor/actee and the relatum holds; an example
of such a relationship is “The cups are beside each other”.
14 ‘Down’, in ‘down the road’, is represented as a PathRepresentingInternal, which, as we saw in Section 3.2, is also the spatial modality used for ‘across’.
15 The grouping of places within a GeneralizedRoute corresponds closely to a semantic interpretation in which places are intersected; in contrast, the
sequences of places created by nextPathPlacement or nextPathIndication correspond to a concatenation of paths as described by Zwarts [169]; we return to
this in Section 5.2.
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– spatialPerspective, when a spatial perspective is expressed for a spatial conﬁguration, e.g., “The desk is to the right from
my point of view” or “Seen from above the helicopters move to the left”.
The distinct kinds of locations and routes deﬁned in GUM are summarized in Fig. 6.
4.5. Spatial elements II: SpatialModality
As we have motivated and illustrated in previous sections, the core of the GUM treatment of spatial relations is provided
by the internal organization and subconcepts of the concept SpatialModality. This is the part of the linguistic ontology that
corresponds to the type of relationship being described in any linguistic spatial description, typically expressed grammati-
cally by a spatial preposition, an adverb, an adjective, a part of the verb, or as entailed by the lexical semantics of the verb.
SpatialModality ﬁlls the hasSpatialModality relation in GeneralizedLocations and speciﬁes the type of spatial relationship to be
construed between a locatum and a relatum in a static conﬁguration, or between an actor/actee and a relatum in a dynamic
conﬁguration. An overview of the subconcepts of SpatialModality is shown in Fig. 7.
The most general distinction is whether the modality constructs distance between entities (SpatialDistanceModality),
functional dependencies between entities (FunctionalSpatialModality), or positions between entities relative to each other
(RelativeSpatialModality):
(25) SpatialModality ≡ SpatialDistanceModality unionsq FunctionalSpatialModality unionsq RelativeSpatialModality
This disjunction is not exclusive; spatial modalities may fall under several of the main categories, as described below.
Different spatial modalities can also be combined by extension (cf. [70])—for instance “left” extends “front” in the expression
“it is to the front left of him”.
Spatial modalities can also be modiﬁed in order to give a more explicit description of the relationship between enti-
ties [168]. Such modiﬁcations are often used in order to describe the placement or the motion more precisely. The following
modiﬁcations are speciﬁed in GUM:
– Qualitative or quantitative spatial information enhances spatial modalities, for instance “diagonally” enhances “left” in
the expression “The TV is diagonally to the left”; in this case the SpatialModality deﬁnes the relation hasEnhancement,
ﬁlled by QualitativeSpatialTemporal or QuantitativeSpatialTemporal entities.
– Spatial modalities can also be modiﬁed by extreme positions, which can be expressed with respect to a speciﬁc dis-
tance or axis. They are usually expressed by superlatives, such as “the leftmost” or “the furthest left” for extreme axis
and “the closest” or “the farthest” for extreme distance information. For these, SpatialModality deﬁnes the relations
extremePositionOnAxis or extremeDistancePosition.
– Angles and distances can be combined with spatial modalities, speciﬁed by the relations qualitativeAngleExtent,
quantitativeAngleExtent for angle information and qualitativeDistanceExtent or quantitativeDistanceExtent for distance
information. Angles and distances can either be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively and the respective rela-
tions are subsumed under qualitativeSpatialExtent and quantitativeSpatialExtent. Examples are “They turn around 180◦”
(quantitativeAngleExtent), “Turn a bit further to your right” (qualitativeAngleExtent), “He moves a bit further forward”
(qualitativeDistanceExtent) and “They go three steps left” (quantitativeDistanceExtent).16
4.5.1. Spatial relationships about distance
A SpatialDistanceModality subsumes expressions about spatial distances between entities. Examples of this concept are
“The plant is 10 meters away from the robot”, “The plant is far away from the robot” or “The plant is by the window”.
Such expressions either embody the distance relation between entities by specifying a quantitative measure (“10 meters”)
or a qualitative measure that either suggests a long distance (“far away from”) or a short distance (“by”). The corresponding
subconcepts of SpatialDistanceModality are therefore QuantitativeDistance and QualitativeDistance; the latter concept then has
the two further subcategories Distal and Proximal.
Other, not directly distance-related expressions can imply a certain amount of space between entities too: NonProjection-
Axial, also a subclass of Disjointness, captures this distance information. This category speciﬁes expressions that indicate a
(relative or absolute) direction according to a speciﬁc axis without presupposing a viewpoint-based projective relationship.
16 The concrete meaning of the expression “a bit further” that describes the extent in the given example is not decomposed further here; it is subsumed
under the GUM concept QualitativeSpatialTemporal (see below).
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positions, such as “It is deep down”, and RelativeNonProjectionAxial, which refers to relative directions such as “They’re
beyond the dining room table”. Moreover, all relationships referring to external projections and external representation of
pathways (see below) necessarily imply distance between the locatum/actor and relatum.
4.5.2. Spatial relationships about functional aspects
A FunctionalSpatialModality subsumes expressions about spatial–functional relations between entities. The functions con-
cern accessibility, motion control, support and containment or their opposites, as described by Coventry, Carlson, and others
[45,36]. Expressions of this kind of spatial–functional relation mostly go together with distance or relative information be-
tween entities. In GUM, FunctionalSpatialModality has the subconcepts Access, Control and DenialOfFunctionalControl.
Access represents relations implying that an entity is physically accessible from another entity, possibly for some ‘pur-
pose’ as intended by this entity (cf. Pustejovsky’s ‘telicity’ ﬁeld in lexical qualia structure: [133, p. 331]). One of its subclasses
is Sequential, which reﬂects spatial relationships that rely on countable or temporal aspects, as in the example “The library is
after the shops” where the relationship between locatum and relatum is reﬂected by a sequential dependency, i.e., it takes a
certain amount of time to move to the placement (“library”). Control represents relations holding between two spatial enti-
ties such that one entity controls the position of another entity in space: i.e., if the ﬁrst entity moves, then the second moves
as well. However, the entities do not necessarily have physical contact with each other. Subconcepts of Control are Support
and Containment. Support indicates that the control of one entity is caused by an external (though not necessarily physical)
contact between the entities, for instance by the presence of gravity (e.g. “The USB drive is on the table”). Containment in-
dicates that the control is caused by (functional) containment (e.g. “The USB drive is in the bag”). DenialOfFunctionalControl
represents relations implying that no spatial–functional relation or contact exists between the entities (e.g. “The USB drive
is outside the room”, “The lion is out of the cage”).
4.5.3. Spatial relationships about relative aspects of entities
RelativeSpatialModality subsumes expressions about relative spatial relationships between entities. Such expressions imply
the involvement of spatial axes (ProjectionRelation), the topological layout between entities (such as Parthood, Connection and
Disjointness), restrictions to complex relata (Distribution), or speciﬁc kinds of shapes of entities (ShapeCommitting).
ProjectionRelations are divided along the natural three-dimensional spatial axes, i.e., language constructs horizon-
tal (namely lateral and frontal) and vertical directions [168,162]. Projective spatial modalities in GUM are accordingly
HorizontalProjection, with subconcepts FrontalProjection and LateralProjection, and VerticalProjection. FrontalProjection is further
subdivided into BackProjection and FrontProjection, corresponding to expressions such as “The board is behind/in front of the
sofa”, LateralProjection is subdivided into LeftProjection and RightProjection, corresponding to expressions such as “The board
is to the left/right of the sofa”. The modality VerticalProjection distinguishes between AboveProjection and BelowProjection,
such as “Birds are ﬂying above/below the clouds”, and UnderProjectionExternal and OverProjectionExternal, such as “Birds are
ﬂying over/under the clouds”; these concepts are then further differentiated according to their functional commitments [46].
The most speciﬁc projective concepts LeftProjection, RightProjection, FrontProjection, BackProjection, AboveProjection, and
BelowProjection are also cross-classiﬁed according to whether they indicate external or internal relationships between en-
tities with respect to topological positions. For example, FrontProjection can cover both ‘in front of the car’ (external) and
‘in the front of the car’ (internal). External projective modalities are additionally subsumed under Disjointness and Proximal,
while internal projective modalities are additionally subsumed under spatial Parthood.
The spatial modality DirectionalRelation covers expressions concerning spatial directions; in many cases these ﬁll source
and destination relations. The concept subsumes the two subconcepts GeneralDirectional, subdivided into GeneralDirectional-
Distancing and GeneralDirectionalNearing, and SpecificDirectional, representing spatial relations that deﬁne directions between
entities independently of additional references (e.g. “out of the house”) or depending on additional references, respectively.
Such additional references are, for instance, geographic information, as speciﬁed by the CardinalDirectional categories and the
TopographicDirectional category [110]. Arbitrary directions (e.g., “to and fro”) are speciﬁed by MultipleDirectional, while clock
directionals (e.g., “The fridge is at three o’clock”) are speciﬁed by ArcDirectional. Different languages tend to construct this se-
mantic area rather differently, most traditionally using conventionalized topographical landmarks, such as ‘uphill’/‘downhill’,
‘towards the sea’/‘away from the sea’, etc. [110, p. 148].
As remarked above, some spatial relations require their relata to consist of either a complex object or multiple objects.
Linguistically, the relatum then appears either expressed in the plural or as a collective term. These kinds of spatial relations
are covered by the modality Distribution. Examples are “It is in the middle of the boxes” (plural) and “He stood among the
crowd” (collective). Collective terms are often associated with the GUM element DecomposableObject, i.e., a concept made
up of different identiﬁable parts.
Spatial locations that construe speciﬁc parts of their relata are deﬁned by the concepts Peripheral and Central, both
subconcepts of spatial Parthood. They construct positions in the middle or at the edge of places, such as “The deer is in
the middle of the ﬁeld” (Central); this example is again an illustration that the distinctions made in GUM are not based on
lexical entries but rest instead on grammatical distinctions. The phrase “in the middle of” can be an instantiation of Central
as well as Distribution.
Finally, ShapeCommitting refers to expressions in which the relatum is restricted to a speciﬁc shape as discussed in
Section 3. There are two subconcepts: PathRepresenting and Surrounding. PathRepresenting deﬁnes spatial relations that
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described with respect to this shape, or the actor moves along this shape. The concept Surrounding deﬁnes spatial relations
between entities in which the relata are located somewhere around the locatum or actor. An example of such an expression
is “Hedges enclosed the ﬂower beds”. Surrounding is also a subconcept of Access.
4.6. Spatial elements III: SimpleThings
The entities that may ﬁll relations referring to participants in a spatial relationship, such as locatum, actor, actee,
and relatum, are generally instances of the element SimpleThing. This element represents entities constructed by lan-
guage as things, and so are generally expressed linguistically by nominal phrases. They can be abstract or concrete,
mental or physical, decomposable or non-decomposable, conscious or non-conscious, all of which are subconcepts of
SimpleThing. SimpleThings also subsume those elements occurring in spatial modiﬁcations, such as QualitativeSpatialTemporal
and QuantitativeSpatialTemporal (cf. Section 4.5). These represent qualitative or quantitative spatial (or temporal) information
for a spatial modality, such as the qualitative modiﬁcation “slightly” in “turn slightly to the right”, or the quantitative infor-
mation “45◦” in “turn 45◦ to the right”. They are connected with the spatial modality by ﬁlling the relation spatialExtent.
Moreover, as seen in Section 3, the particular combination of spatial modalities and types of entities can itself bring further
constraints on those entities’ spatial construal (cf. [7,24]).
Certain other thing-like entities also make speciﬁcally spatial commitments that require modeling in a way that ap-
propriately captures their interaction with the spatial modalities they are used with. These are often carried by groups of
individual lexical items and so lie at the very edge of what we include within GUM—although there is also usually gram-
matical evidence to be found from the particular constructions within which they appear. We illustrate three distinct kinds
of such classes here.
First, most lexical items for physical objects bring with them commitments concerning the relative extent of their di-
mensionalities, as described in considerable detail by Lang (e.g., [105]): this is used to motivate distinctive usage patterns
such as ‘the height of the man’ vs. ‘the length of the shadow’. Although not yet present in GUM, an account such as Lang’s
would clearly be a useful and appropriate extension. Second, there is a further set of lexical items that may be beneﬁcially
described as nominalizations of spatial modalities, quite analogously to nominalizations of other categories, typically conﬁg-
urations, which are already covered in our generation grammars (cf. Section 5.1). Examples of these kinds of entities include
spatial ‘parts’, such as interior, top, bottom, edge, center, border and so on. Considering these as nominalizations allows them
to share the semantic accounts given for their respective spatial modalities and to avoid additional separate treatments
within GUM itself. Third, there are also kinds of spatial ‘features’, such as bump, hole, corner and so on. These are strongly
shape committing, although the particular shapes committed to are quite varied as is usual when we move towards the
open-class, lexical end of linguistic information.
Both these latter types of spatial terms can be reﬁned further for particular domains of application: for example, coast
is a speciﬁcally geographic kind of edge, and mountain might be seen as a speciﬁcally geographic kind of ‘bump’. Finer
classiﬁcations of these kinds of entities remain for the future: it will be particularly interesting to compare existing proposals
for classiﬁcatory features with those predicted from the spatial modalities hierarchy.
4.7. Conclusion
In this section we have presented the organization and main concepts and roles of our spatial extension for the Gener-
alized Upper Model. As we shall see in the evaluation in Section 6, these possibilities cover a substantial proportion of the
spatial expressions found in our test corpora, although there is still need for extension and comparison with the situation
for other languages (cf. [6,76,77,153,155]). At the present time the GUM ontology as a whole consists of 270 concepts and
110 relations. Of this total, the spatial fragment as described here contributes 98 concepts (36%) and 28 relations (25%),
thus forming a signiﬁcant extension in scope and detail over the original GUM.
The spatial extension has had little effect on the DL expressivity of GUM. The core ontology of GUM is formalized in
ALCHN , i.e., its logic allows role hierarchy (H), cardinality restrictions (N ), and ALC-related operators (namely atomic
negation, universal restrictions, concept intersection, limited existential quantiﬁcation, and class complements). The spatial
fragment is slightly more expressive than this core part by virtue of introducing data valued roles (also called datatype prop-
erties in OWL) and qualiﬁed cardinality restrictions: for instance, the spatial extension deﬁnes a relation reciprocalRelation
with a boolean data range, which speciﬁes whether a spatial relation is reciprocal; furthermore, the ranges of some of
GUM’s spatial roles are not deﬁned by subclasses of Thing, such as the role orientationRoute, which is ﬁlled with an instance
of GeneralizedRoute that cannot deﬁne a pathPlacement or a pathIndication. As a consequence, the spatial extension of GUM
is expressed in the logic ALCHQ(D) and remains, as we shall see in the next section, a broad practical linguistic ontology
appropriate for a range of natural language processing tasks. The ontology as a whole has been validated as a formally con-
sistent speciﬁcation; this follows relatively straightforwardly from the fact that GUM contains virtually no cases of negation
and so the resulting description is more or less guaranteed to be formally consistent. This has been veriﬁed for the current
version using Protégé17 with the Pellet DL reasoner.18
17 http://protege.stanford.edu/.
18 http://pellet.owldl.com.
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We have now set out in some detail the categories we propose for a linguistic ontology of space and their interrela-
tionships. The question now arises as to how we can assess and evaluate this proposal’s applicability and adequacy. In
this section, we address this issue from the perspective of use of the ontology. We will consider how the ontology can be
beneﬁcial for applications and how it contributes to the construction of semantic interpretations.
5.1. Context of use
In our own work on spatial language, we employ GUM and its spatial extension as the semantic layer in a complete
natural language dialogue system enabling interaction both with autonomous robots and with spatial assistance systems
providing way-ﬁnding or navigation services (e.g., [137,139,138]). For the purposes of the present paper, we can regard the
architecture of the system as fairly traditional: speech or written input is passed on to an analysis component that produces
semantic representations, these semantic representations are related both to contextual information and to the current state
of the dialogue, certain problem-solving tasks are triggered (e.g., ﬁnding routes, locating services, etc.), and the results are
converted back into a semantic representation, which is then passed back through a generation component to produce either
spoken or written output. The problem-solving components of our system represent domain knowledge using ontologies
expressed in description logic and perform their tasks using the well-known description logic reasoners Pellet19 and Racer,20
some application-speciﬁc implementations of navigation and route-ﬁnding algorithms, as well as further dedicated spatial
reasoners.
The role of GUM in this environment is to support natural language interaction by deﬁning the semantic types and con-
straints that hold at the semantic level of analysis: instantial information of the type used for illustration in the previous
section is produced by the analysis component and triggers contextualization. However, in contrast to many systems where
contextualization is seen as a process of further speciﬁcation ﬁlling in the underspeciﬁed semantics derived from the in-
put [91,88], with GUM we allow for a much broader range of ‘inter-ontology’ alignments between the linguistic ontology
(and instantial information with respect to that ontology) and the ontologies of the application (and instantial data with
respect to these). It is in this latter approach to contextualization that much of the ﬂexibility of natural spatial language
usage is achieved.
Our automatic generation component, taking semantic speciﬁcations formulated in terms of GUM to surface strings, fol-
lows the long established techniques for using the Penman Upper Model in natural language generation (cf. Section 2.3
above), relying on broad coverage systemic-functional generation grammars for English and German [17]. More interesting
for the current paper, however, is the approach we take to analysis, since (a) an Upper Model-based semantics has not
previously been coupled with an analysis component and (b) the requirements of analysis demand a more careful consider-
ation of semantic compositionality during interpretation. The basis of our analysis component also turns out, nevertheless,
to be relatively straightforward. We have adopted the framework of combinatory categorial grammar, and more speciﬁcally
the version producing Hybrid Logic Dependency Semantics (HLDS) developed by Kruijff and Baldridge [11]. HLDS speciﬁca-
tions are sorted hybrid modal logic representations, in which the sorts are provided by semantic type hierarchies deﬁned
along with the grammar. The grammars themselves are highly lexicalized and the semantics of lexical items use the same
deﬁned semantic types. Semantic interpretations of utterances are built up by functional composition in the usual way. For
performing the analysis itself we employ the OpenCCG toolset.21
Our initial analysis grammars were constructed exactly parallel to the spatial language analysis grammars developed
by Kruijff and colleagues [96] with the single exception that the semantic types employed in lexical entries are, in our
case, drawn from the GUM ontology. The HLDS analysis results of Kruijff et al., in contrast, employ semantic types adopted
from a combined linguistic-domain commonsense ontology. This is a practical solution in their case because the domain
of application is relatively ﬁxed and the spatial language that occurs accordingly limited in scope. It would, however, be
interesting to consider a GUM-based semantic layer in the context of their system also.
The ﬁnal connection to our discussion here lies in bridging between HLDS speciﬁcations and ABox assertions within
description logic. Due to the close formal relationship existing between modal logic and description logic [11], it is in fact
straightforward to consider the output of our grammars produced using OpenCCG as ABox assertions of exactly the kind we
have given in our examples above. We show this very brieﬂy here as follows. Our grammars contain lexical items of the
form depicted in Fig. 8 for spatial prepositions such as in, on, etc. On the left-hand side of the ﬁgure we ﬁnd a complex
syntactic category and on the right-hand side its corresponding semantics. This particular lexical item then states that one
syntactic reading of ‘in’ is as a category that is ‘looking’ for an NP on its right-hand side (indicated by the forward slash) in
order to construct the complex category NP\NP—i.e., a category that is itself looking for an NP on its left (indicated by the
backslash) to yield an NP: in other words, an NP post-modiﬁer such as a PP.22 The semantics for this category includes the
19 http://pellet.owldl.com.
20 http://www.sts.tu-harburg.de/~r.f.moeller/racer.
21 http://openccg.sourceforge.net/.
22 We should note that our grammars are still under development and so nothing rests upon the particular categories given here: the mechanisms for
composition are not affected.
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np\∗np/∗np :
@x1:gs-GeneralizedLocation
(<gs-hasSpatialModality>(x2:gs-Containment ^ in)
<gs-relatum>x4:gum-SimpleThing) ^
@x6:gs-SpatialLocating
(<gs-locatum>x5 ^ <gs-placement>x1)
Fig. 8. One of our OpenCCG lexical entries for the spatial preposition in as an NP modiﬁer. The preﬁx gs- stands for ‘GUM space’, symbols before colons
are variable names, the at symbol (@) marks HLDS named ‘nominals’, the caret (ˆ) is logical conjunction, and the symbols within angle brackets correspond
to roles.
(@x1:gs-SpatialLocating
(<gs-locatum>b1:slm-Box ^
<gs-placement>
(x2:gs-GeneralizedLocation ^
<gs-hasSpatialModality>
(o1:gs-Support ^ on) ^
<gs-relatum>s1:slm-Shelf)) ^
@x3:gs-SpatialLocating
(<gs-locatum>s1:slm-Shelf ^
<gs-placement>
(x4:gs-GeneralizedLocation ^
<gs-hasSpatialModality>
(i1:gs-Containment ^ in) ^
<gs-relatum>
k1:slm-Kitchen)) ^
@b1:slm-Box)
(@x1:gs-SpatialLocating
(<gs-locatum>b1:slm-Box ^
<gs-placement>
(x2:gs-GeneralizedLocation ^
<gs-hasSpatialModality>
(i1:gs-Containment ^ in) ^
<gs-relatum>k1:slm-Kitchen)) ^
@x3:gs-SpatialLocating
(<gs-locatum>b1:slm-Box ^
<gs-placement>
(x4:gs-GeneralizedLocation ^
<gs-hasSpatialModality>
(o1:gs-Support ^ on) ^
<gs-relatum>s1:slm-Shelf)) ^
@b1:slm-Box)
Fig. 9. The HLDS speciﬁcations produced with our grammars for the phrases in ((26)a: left-hand side) and in ((26)b: right-hand side). The preﬁx slm stands
for ‘semantic lower model’, a semantic lexicon deﬁned for the domain.
two semantic types necessary for this reading: ﬁrst, a GeneralizedLocation corresponding to the NP\NP (or PP), providing a
semantic ‘place’; and second, a SpatialLocating that has the place as its placement and an empty slot, x5, for the object to
be located. This is then directly comparable with the single-place predicate interpretation given in Section 3.1 above. The
GeneralizedLocation contains a spatial modality appropriate for ‘in’, i.e., Containment, which is classiﬁed within GUM as one
of two kinds of functional control (cf. Fig. 7). The full form of the entry also links the semantics of the middle NP with
the variable x5 (the locatum), since this is the NP being sought on the left, and the semantics of the rightmost NP with the
variable x4 (the relatum); in short, the semantics corresponds to that of a phrase [x5 in x4]NP just as described in Section 3
above.
The work of constructing complete semantic speciﬁcations is then carried out by functional application, modelled in
OpenCCG by uniﬁcation. Fig. 9 shows the semantics that result when the phrases in (26) are parsed with our current
grammars.
(26) a. the box on the shelf in the kitchen
b. the box in the kitchen on the shelf
Naturally, many more parses are produced but those shown are the ﬁrst two returned for each phrase; we also delete
here all attribute values that are not concerned with spatial information. The most signiﬁcant difference between the two
is that quite different spatial relationships have been constructed. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, it is the shelf that is in the
kitchen (SpatialLocating x3), whereas in the second it is the box that is in the kitchen (SpatialLocating x1). We have tuned
the grammars so that more likely interpretations are produced ﬁrst: in the present case, it is less likely that one ﬁnds the
kitchen on the shelf—although, of course, this is still semantically possible (the kitchen may be a doll’s house kitchen for
example) and so is still present as a less favored parse. The correspondences with the Manchester syntax speciﬁcations used
elsewhere in this paper should be self evident.23 There is still substantial work to be done in selecting the most contextually
appropriate parses from the solution set returned; however, our concern at present is simply to restrict that set to spatially
possible parses.
For more straightforward utterances our grammars are already showing useful results. Although these grammars remain
experimental, we have benchmarked them against two testbeds of spatial language constructions. The ﬁrst testbed was built
23 This is a straightforward syntactic translation. Within our dialogue system we use the XML form of output from OpenCCG and convert this via XSLT to
a syntax appropriate for the DL reasoners we use.
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extension documentation [83], while the second testbed is derived from the spatial language corpora used in the evaluation
of linguistic coverage that we describe in Section 6.1. At the time of submission the English grammar provides parses for
98% of the ﬁrst testbed, and just over 50% for the larger corpus-derived testbed. As with all our resources, the analysis
grammars are freely available for use and extension.24
Although hand-crafted grammars of this kind have substantially smaller coverage than wide-coverage statistical parsers,
we believe that their accuracy and quality is signiﬁcantly higher with respect to spatial language than existing statistical
parsers. Statistical approaches neither provide a detailed account of spatial meaning, nor take spatial semantic constraints
into account in the parsing process. That notwithstanding, the application of the GUM ontology to existing wide coverage
linguistic resources also poses a challenging and useful direction for future research. Moreover, while the manual annotation
of spatial data with respect to proposed ontological categories described in Section 6.1 is a useful measure of overall model
coverage, it is evident that a far better indication of coverage could be obtained if analysis were automated.
5.2. Representational and semantic levels: Adequate inferences
The provision of a linguistic ontology makes possible the performance of a particular range of inferences, both internally
to the ontology and with respect to the modules and other layers of information with which it is intended to interact.
Another argument for our decomposition of the spatial semantics problem is that different kinds of inferential work can be
distributed more appropriately. In this subsection, we set out this role of our linguistic ontology in more detail.
5.2.1. Compositionality and interpretation
We have seen in this section how instantial semantic representations of utterances (represented as ABox assertions
within description logic or, equivalently, as HLDS speciﬁcations) can be constructed employing an appropriate computational
analysis grammar. We consider in this subsection where this stands in the entire chain of interpretation that we require
for a situated spatial dialogue system and spatial contextualization. We can consider the ability to construct appropriately
structured semantic speciﬁcations anchored against the semantic terms of the linguistic ontology as a rather weak kind of
compositionality. The semantic speciﬁcations of complete phrases are composed from the semantic speciﬁcations of their
components, respecting the constraints on concept construction speciﬁed in the ontology. But for further contextualization,
it is necessary to consider what these semantic speciﬁcations mean in their own right.
We stressed in the opening sections of the paper how we were committed to an ‘indirect’ approach to spatial semantics,
one which resists immediate interpretations of linguistic spatial expressions in terms of, for example, regions of three-
dimensional space, in order to avoid over-commitment and inﬂexibility in interpretation. We therefore see GUM semantic
speciﬁcations as performing the following central task in building interpretations. Information derived from utterances is
organized according to GUM into speciﬁc relationships and categories. The function of this organization is to provide anchor
points to which constraints on appropriate kinds of (non-linguistic) spatial semantics can be attached. These constraints are
seen as ‘minimal’ properties to be met by (non-linguistic) spatial formalizations of particular linguistic semantic categories
rather than speciﬁc accounts of space ‘as a whole’. Flexibility in interpretation then results from the fact that a variety of
different spatial theories might be adopted, as long as the minimal conditions on what is to be expressed for a particular
category are met.
We will illustrate this approach by example, showing how it opens up several important directions for future research.
In particular, we can usefully relate the framework to earlier discussions of the so-called ‘two-level approach’ to linguistic
semantics (e.g., [164,165,104]), in which a compositional semantic level is separated from a non-compositional ‘conceptual’
level. We also seek to maintain a compositional semantic level but go further by applying newly emerging results in ontology
structuring and inter-ontology alignment to explore the relationships between levels within a more formal setting [100–102,
99]. Detailed discussion of this component of our work goes beyond the scope of the present paper (see [81,82,80]), but
our examples will suggest the line of development we are following. It should, however, be noted here that it is only
with an ontology-like speciﬁcation of the linguistic semantics, such as that offered by GUM for example, that the tools of
inter-ontology alignment become applicable to this problem at all. We also see this as an important contribution of our
approach.
Most of the more formal approaches to spatial language introduced in Section 2 above have also aimed for composition-
ality. We saw there that some choices of spatial formalization are less suitable than others. The geometric (time-dependent)
three-dimensional space interpretations of Kracht and of Francez and Steedman [94,58], for example, restricted the scope of
their accounts to what we have termed ‘geometrically transparent’ usages. Extending beyond this, the treatment of modiﬁca-
tion in spatial prepositional phrases proposed by Zwarts [168]—such as “one meter behind the desk”, “right under the lamp”,
“far outside the village”—provides further convincing evidence that a compositional approach based on three-dimensional
regions cannot be suﬃcient since information necessary for the construction of interpretations of these modiﬁed phrases is
then simply not available. In particular, to support a composition in which the semantics of one meter and the semantics
of behind the desk, or the semantics of right and under the lamp, can be combined, it is necessary for the denotations of
24 http://www.diaspace.org/grammars.
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set of points making up a region. Zwarts argues that the appropriate denotation for spatial expressions is therefore to be
found in sets of vectors pre-anchored in the speciﬁed reference objects. Distance modiﬁcation then constrains the length of
the vectors considered, and direction modiﬁcation constrains which out of a broader range of vectors at issue is relevant
according to angle.
This perspective is useful because it emphasizes an important precondition for compositionality as such: if the informa-
tion necessary for a composition is not available in the entities being composed, then it will not be possible to construct
a compositional account: whatever information is placed within the semantics of our linguistic spatial entities, we need
to ensure that it is suﬃcient for the meanings that are to be constructed with it. We can expect, therefore, that further
properties beyond the sets of vectors that Zwarts proposed will also be required: for example, functional notions may sup-
port modiﬁcations of the kind “properly on the table”, “right over the brush” and so on: this suggests that telic notions
will also belong in the semantic speciﬁcation as proposed for lexical semantics in general by Pustejovsky [132]. Patterns of
modiﬁcation are then also shown to offer grammatical syndromes relevant in the construction of our semantics.
Different areas of the linguistic ontology appear to require support from different kinds of abstract spatial theories.
In Section 2.2 above, we brieﬂy mentioned Eschenbach’s account of ‘front’/‘behind’ and ‘left’/‘right’ in terms of half-lines
and half-planes respectively [53,54]. To the extent that this characterization is further supported by empirical studies, we
associate such distinct abstract theories with GUM categories in order to provide a summary of the abstract spatial com-
mitments of those categories: for example, the spatial modality LateralProjection would then be connected with a theory
that at least deﬁnes half-planes. The subconcepts of this category within GUM, i.e., RightProjection and LeftProjection, are
then associated with theories formally extending that of the superconcept. Precisely which kinds of extensions are called
for in each case, for example whether they are conservative (cf. [4,101]) or not, itself deﬁnes several important further
research questions. A similar situation holds for the spatial modality FrontalProjection and its subcategories BackProjection
and FrontProjection—this area would, given appropriate support, be related to a theory of half-lines in the same way.
The entire area of routes, destinations, sources, etc. described in the previous section under the concept GeneralizedRoute
requires a different treatment. The distinctions drawn here on grammatical evidence appear to be covered well by Zwarts’
proposals for an algebra of paths [169], related to his notion of sets of vectors mentioned above. Zwarts’ use of linguis-
tic aspect in his argumentation also illustrates another powerful grammatical syndrome: the inter-relationship of notions
of boundedness and temporality. In addition, certain properties of paths that he speciﬁes algebraically provide important
guidelines for interpreting the distinct combinations of routes and paths speciﬁed in GUM. For example, we distinguished in
Section 4 above between location expressions consisting of components that co-describe a route—for example, by giving its
source and destination—and expressions that describe a sequence of path segments. The GUM speciﬁcation of these is quite
distinct and allows us to associate their interpretations with path intersection or path concatenation respectively. Zwarts’
results concerning constraints on aspect are then directly importable, as we will illustrate in the subsection following.
The bundling of source, destination and path information within the GUM concept GeneralizedRoute also makes contact
with the body of work drawn on by Kracht [94]. His formal distinction between modes (concerning movement) and local-
izers (static relationships) corresponds loosely with GUM’s division between roles of the GeneralizedRoute (Kracht’s modes)
and the places ﬁlling those roles (Kracht’s location phrases). Similar constructs are given by Asher and Sablayrolles in their
account of French motion verbs [6]. Moreover, we see here clearly the value of maintaining a looser coupling between
GUM speciﬁcations and corresponding spatial theories since the approaches to semantic interpretation taken by Kracht and
by Asher and Sablayrolles are signiﬁcantly different. For Kracht, we have a normal case of compositionality by which the
meaning of the mode (the directionality) is composed with that of the location phrase; for Asher and Sablayrolles, we have
instead many cases of nonmonotonic discourse interpretation. Both approaches have beneﬁcial properties and it is by no
means clear at this time whether one account is always to be preferred to the other. However, regardless of the account we
select, the same kinds of distinctions will need to be drawn on the basis of the linguistic utterances considered. These dis-
tinctions may then be interpreted further in various ways, but the grammatical syndromes drawn upon for their formulation
will not change. Thus we can strongly presume that any account proposed will need the distinctions drawn by GUM; more-
over, any account drawing on these distinctions receives as a by-product a well speciﬁed mapping down to surface form.
To show these various features of our account in slightly more detail, we turn from an abstract comparison to one
concrete case of compositional semantic interpretation drawing on Kracht’s description. This illustrates our suggested use of
GUM as a collection point for semantic constraints. As already mentioned, within Kracht’s account the semantics of modes
combines with that of location phrases. The semantics of localizers, i.e., spatial prepositions, are taken to be functions that
take a referent object (our relatum) and a time, and which produce the set of regions standing in some speciﬁed geometric
relationship with the reference object at that time [94, p. 188]. The semantics of modes is then constructed essentially by
decomposing temporal intervals in order to characterize when propositions hold. For example, the notion of a ‘coinitial’
mode insists that some spatial conﬁguration obtains at the ‘beginning’ of the period over which an event is described. Thus,
in Kracht’s sentence:
(27) The cat came out from under the table.
we have a (static) location phrase “under the table” that Kracht takes as denoting the set of three-dimensional regions
geometrically ‘under’ the table at any given time and the mode for ‘from’ picks out temporal intervals in which the location
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the event as a whole: i.e., the cat started out under the table and ends up not under the table. The multiword lexeme ‘came
out’ then provides a set of events with which this semantics must be combined. As with Francez and Steedman’s account,
the semantics of the spatial terms here incorporates many items that are not strictly to do with spatial language but which
serve to bind together information during composition; these are also speciﬁc to the ﬁne-grained detail of the account as a
whole.25
A description of the same sentence drawing on GUM’s categories (and which would be produced by automatic analysis)
can be seen by analogy to example (24) above; this description involves a NonAffectingDirectedMotion with an actor of a cat
and a route. The ﬁller of the route role is supplied as usual by the spatial prepositional phrase, in this case: “from under the
table”. The ‘from’ is picked up as a speciﬁcation of the source of the route, also as usual. Now, when we turn to the em-
bedded phrase “under the table”, we have a difference to our earlier example. The spatial modality of a GeneralizedLocation
ﬁlling the slot of a source depends on the syntactic category of the linguistic unit expressing that GeneralizedLocation. When
this is a noun phrase (e.g., “from the hill”), the spatial modality is provided by the source as a GeneralDirectionalDistancing;
this is analogous to a coercion or the interpretation of an empty place-indicating ‘preposition’ in those accounts that strongly
bind syntactic structure to semantic structure (cf. [95]). When the embedded unit is a prepositional phrase, however, it con-
tributes its own spatial modality directly. The GUM speciﬁcation of the embedded PP here is also constructed as normal,
yielding for “under the table” a GeneralizedLocation with relatum “table” and a hasSpatialModality of UnderProjectionExternal,
a subcategory of VerticalProjection, Disjointness and functional Access (cf. Fig. 7). Each of these superconcepts contributes
spatial theories for further interpretation; the vertical projection may be appropriate for a half-plane description in the style
proposed for ‘left’/‘right’ by Eschenbach above (with the addition of gravity as a potential orientational anchor) or as a set of
(downward pointing) vectors as proposed by Zwarts, disjointness may be covered by a spatial mereology or region calculus,
and access by some notion of ‘protection from’ (as in “under the umbrella”).
For the semantic interpretation of the combined phrase, we combine the contributing semantics of source and its
GeneralizedLocation accordingly. Our general ontological approach is committed to high degrees of modularity, leading us to
maintain domains as separate as far as possible. This is most compatible with the treatment of Zwarts, who also attempts
to keep spatial semantics purely spatial. With an association of GeneralizedRoute with Zwarts’ path algebra, we can take
the denotation of the current route as the set of paths originating in the place given by the source. But, alternatively, with
an association with Asher and Sablayrolles’ spatial regions relevant for movement, we could similarly have a path from a
speciﬁed starting area. The GUM backbone speciﬁcation tells us which semantic contributions are to be combined, but does
not demand conformance to one particular non-linguistic spatial construal rather than another.
The ﬁnal part of the semantic interpretation is carried by the additional fact that the GeneralizedRoute ﬁlls the role of a
route in the NonAffectingDirectedMotion spatial conﬁguration as a whole. This calls for the information to be combined and,
again, several options are available. Possibilities include taking the intersection of events from Kracht, the relation of two
domains (the spatial ‘trace’ of the event and the path itself) from Zwarts, or the simpler logical conjunction of Asher and
Sablayrolles axioms for verbs of movement.
In a sense, the speciﬁcations produced with respect to the linguistic ontology provide a skeleton for compositional
semantic interpretation that generalizes both across differing syntactic treatments and across different theories of space.
We do not believe that it is possible at this time (and perhaps it will never be possible) to decide once and for all on the
spatial theory appropriate for all natural language spatial semantics in all contexts of use. As a consequence, we consider the
provision of a linguistic ontology such as GUM as an essential mediator between approaches and between levels. Different
contexts of use may well demand spatial theories with differing formal properties; with the associations to abstract spatial
theories pursued with respect to GUM, we therefore seek to provide explicit speciﬁcations of the minimal requirements
that need to be met by a spatial theory when particular kinds of spatial language are to be used. In subsequent phases
of interpretation, we then relate statements made in these spatial theories to non-linguistic, domain-oriented descriptions
of space, which may also be ontological in nature. This approach also avoids the danger of needing to bring ever more
non-linguistically motivated information into the shallow semantics in order to provide for later compositionality.
5.2.2. Internal inferential relationships within GUM
In the previous subsection we saw the role of GUM as offering a guide for subsequent semantic interpretation. In this
subsection we consider the inferential possibilities provided by GUM itself. Most obviously, the GUM ontology can be used
to analyze whether a speciﬁcation of a particular sentence satisﬁes certain conditions and requirements. For instance, a
direction can only be deﬁned by a NonAffectingSpatialDoing or AffectingSpatialAction, but not by a SpatialLocating. Such de-
pendencies and constraints can be automatically veriﬁed in terms of ontological consistency of the sentence instantiation
(ABox consistency) using standard description logic reasoners. They then also feed into syntactic analysis via semantic type
checking during composition. This information is important for subsequent interpretation because it makes it possible to
identify semantic gaps and constraints that raise explicit goals for pragmatic contextualization.
We exemplify four types of linguistic inference supported by GUM speciﬁcations: two for utterances taken from our
corpus, an invented one inspired by arguments put forward by Kracht [94], and a ﬁnal set of examples showing how
25 For some further discussion focusing on linguistic aspects of the accounts of Kracht, Francez and Steedman, Asher and Sablayrolles, and Zwarts in
comparison to our own, see Bateman [13].
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powerful formalizations might wrongly suggest as plausible.
We start with example (28) in order to show both what information is entailed and where pragmatic inferences must
take this further.
(28) neunzig Grad Rechtsdrehung
ninety degrees rotation to the right
The corresponding GUM speciﬁcation is as follows (the speciﬁcation of angleDegrees, an instance of QualitativeSpatial-
Temporal, is omitted for simplicity):
(29) Individual: NAOC Individual: GenLoc
Types: NonAffectingOrientationChange Types: GeneralizedLocation
Facts: actor undeﬁned Facts: relatum undeﬁned
processInConfiguration rotating hasSpatialModality RightProjection
orientationDirection GenLoc quantitativeAngleExtent angleDegrees
Although semantically unambiguous, this phrase is underspeciﬁed with respect to its contextual interpretation. Nevertheless,
the phrase succeeds in evoking a range of realistic expectations about what kind of spatial movement is being described.
The GUM speciﬁcation captures semantic entailments that drive these intuitions as follows.
First, the conﬁguration as a whole is deﬁned as NonAffectingOrientationChange. This implies (going down the hierarchy
in GUM to the corresponding branch) that:
(i) DoingAndHappening: Somebody is doing something or something is happening. This event involves at least a processIn-
Configuration, which is here deﬁned as ‘drehen’ (rotate).
(ii) NonAffectingAction: The event doesn’t affect anybody or anything; there is no actee in this conﬁguration, whose role
would otherwise need to be ﬁlled.
(iii) NonAffectingDoing: The event involves an actor who is doing something. This role is not given explicitly in the conﬁgu-
ration and can be formally identiﬁed as missing.
(iv) NonAffectingSpatialDoing: The event is a spatial action; therefore it may deﬁne a placement where the action takes place:
this is not the case here and so we know that this information although potentially relevant is not being provided
directly.
(v) NonAffectingMotion: The actor performs a spatial movement, namely one of three possibilities: directed motion (route or
direction), orientation change (orientationDirection or orientationRoute), or simple motion (placement).
(vi) NonAffectingOrientationChange: The movement performed by the actor is a change in orientation, deﬁned by the relation
orientationDirection.
The relation orientationDirection is ﬁlled by a GeneralizedLocation, which requires at least a spatial modality and a relatum.
While the relation hasSpatialModality is deﬁned as RightProjection, the slot for the relation relatum remains unﬁlled (‘turn to
the right of what?’).
By this point, therefore, we have identiﬁed where speciﬁc information needs to be added by pragmatic inference for
full contextualization. For example, one default relatum for the right direction in such a situation would be the actor, i.e.,
the actor would turn to their own right. Further pragmatic information may be derived from the (linguistic or situational)
discourse context; if the actor has been the addressee in previous utterances, it can be inferred pragmatically that this is also
true for the current (semantically undeﬁned) actor, who is then animate (derived from the fact of being an addressee), with
a high likelihood of possessing intrinsic directions, thus instantiating a likely relatum. Thus, GUM identiﬁes the expected
roles and concepts for a particular conﬁguration. At speciﬁc points in the hierarchy, the requirements of the GUM concept
deﬁnitions highlight that both the actor and the relatum are missing. To fully understand the description, the information
about who is doing the turning action, and what the direction ‘right’ relates to, need to be ascertained. The fact that the
‘90 degree’ information is optional suggests that there is some redundancy involved here—a reorientation to the right, for
example, can be interpreted even without the quantitative speciﬁcation.
Our next example illustrates how semantic ambiguity leads to different kinds of possible inferences, again using an
example from our corpus.
(30) Go down three inches.
Corresponding GUM speciﬁcations are given in (31); we omit the internal deﬁnition of the instance distExtent as this is not
of central concern. We see here that there is already semantic ambiguity to be resolved. The spatial expression ‘down’ is
lexically compatible with at least two distinct readings: one as involving a SpecificDirectional spatial modality, another as a
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interpretation.
(31) Individual: NADM1 Individual: GenLoc
Types: NonAffectingDirectedMotion Types: GeneralizedLocation
Facts: actor undeﬁned.1 Facts: relatum undeﬁned.1
processInConfiguration going hasSpatialModality SpecificDirectional
direction GenLoc quantitativeDistanceExtent distExtent
– OR –
Individual: NADM2 Individual: GenRoute
Types: NonAffectingDirectedMotion Types: GeneralizedRoute
Facts: actor undeﬁned Facts: pathPlacement GPL
processInConfiguration going Individual: GPL
route GenRoute Types: GeneralizedPathLocation
hasSpatialModality PathRepresentingInternal
relatum undeﬁned
quantitativeDistanceExtent distExtent
Construction of the semantics proceeds as follows. Spatial modalities contribute to GeneralizedLocations (cf. Fig. 5 or
Deﬁnition (10)). In the ﬁrst reading, the SpecificDirectional modality suggested lexically allows a GeneralizedLocation to be
built directly; the spatial extent of “three inches” is combined as a quantitativeDistantExtent (cf. Section 4.5). In the second
reading, the alternative PathRepresentingInternal modality supports a ﬁner classiﬁcation as part of a GeneralizedPathLocation,
i.e., as a segment of a path; the spatial extent information is treated as in the ﬁrst reading. In both cases no relatum is
explicitly supplied by the linguistic form, although semantically required (and hence entailed).
Developing the ﬁrst alternative further, a GeneralizedLocation may ﬁll a variety of roles, including a placement
role in SpatialLocating conﬁgurations (cf. (15)), a source or destination in generalized routes (23), a direction role
in a NonAffectingDirectedMotion (18), an orientationDirection in a NonAffectingOrientationChange (20), and so on.26 The
verb contributes particular lexical information that supports a NonAffectingDirectedMotion analysis and this binds the
GeneralizedLocation into the spatial conﬁguration as a direction. Here, although the actor is not speciﬁed in the linguis-
tic form, the imperative allows this to be ﬁlled with the addressee. Moreover, the relatum of directions is always the
actor/mover and therefore is also identiﬁable by co-reference (indicated in the speciﬁcation by the extension .1) without
further pragmatic interpretation.
The second alternative is more constrained from the outset; a GeneralizedPathLocation can only form the pathPlacement
or the pathIndication in a GeneralizedRoute (23). Here, the internal path is not construed as a point and so pathPlacement is
the appropriate choice. The lexical semantics of the verb as a NonAffectingDirectedMotion also makes available the possibility
of binding a GeneralizedRoute into the conﬁguration with the route role (18) and so this is a further possible semantic
analysis for the example sentence as a whole. In this case, the fact that a relatum is left unspeciﬁed in the surface form
for the spatial modality has consequences differing to those for the ﬁrst interpretation. Since the required modality is not
a direction but a PathRepresentingInternal, this means that the action takes place in relation to an entity that is capable of
representing the path; such entities could be hallways, streets, roads, rivers, borders, etc. This information does then need
to be ﬁlled in pragmatically. The explicit mention of a relatum can disambiguate the two possible interpretations of ‘down’.
In our third example, we illustrate how GUM leads to limited inferences with respect to the ambiguous and pragmatically
highly underspeciﬁed (though semantically complete) example shown in (32).
(32) Jack ran in front of the bus.
The corresponding GUM speciﬁcations are:
(33) Individual: NAM Individual: GenLoc1
Types: NonAffectingMotion Types: GeneralizedLocation
Facts: actor Jack Facts: relatum Bus
processInConfiguration running hasSpatialModality FrontProjectionExternal
placement GenLoc1
– OR –
26 In current work we are exploring further the extent to which ﬁner-grained role ﬁller constraints can reduce the potential range of interpretations
earlier; this is primarily a combined empirical-semantic analysis task.
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Types: NonAffectingDirectedMotion Types: GeneralizedRoute
Facts: actor Jack Facts: destination GenLoc2
processInConfiguration running Individual: GenLoc2
route GenRoute Types: GeneralizedLocation
relatum Bus
hasSpatialModality FrontProjectionExternal
Following through the detailed interpretation in the manner shown in the previous example, this utterance can be inter-
preted in two basic ways. In the case of a NonAffectingMotion interpretation, a spatial action is speciﬁed without a direction
or orientation; however, the location where the motion takes place is speciﬁed via a placement relation: the action of run-
ning takes place in front of the bus. In the case of a NonAffectingDirectedMotion interpretation, the destination of a route is
speciﬁed as being in front of the bus. In both cases, this exhausts the possible speciﬁcations based on the given semantics
of the utterance. A number of inferences can be drawn on this basis. If the utterance is interpreted as being part of a route,
this entails that other route elements can be added, namely a source, pathIndications, and pathPlacements.
Consider the following example in which these optional slots are ﬁlled:
(34) Jack ran out of the house, through the gate, across the ﬁeld, and in front of the bus.
Here the alternative reading of a motion event taking place in front of the bus is very much less likely, since the presence of
a source (‘out of the house’) induces a GeneralizedRoute interpretation. Furthermore, the fact that a destination constitutes
the end point of a motion conﬁguration entails that the action is bounded, while no such inference holds for the place-
ment interpretation. Boundedness is traditionally tested by considering the acceptability and logical consequences of adding
various temporal adjuncts [169], as in:
(35) Jack ran in front of the bus for three hours.
Here, only the placement interpretation is available. Adding ‘for three hours’ to the modiﬁed example (34) renders the
sentence semantically unacceptable in the intended sense:
(36) * Jack ran out of the house, through the gate, across the ﬁeld, and in front of the bus for three hours.
In contrast, adding another punctual event is unproblematic for the destination version (example (37)) but unacceptable for
the placement version (example (38)):
(37) Jack ran out of the house, through the gate, across the ﬁeld, and in front of the bus. He was killed immediately.
(38) * Jack ran in front of the bus for three hours. He was killed immediately.
In addition to these semantically based inferences, pragmatic considerations open up a further range of interpre-
tations, all of which are nevertheless perfectly possible given the linguistic material considered. The spatial modality
FrontProjectionExternal does not indicate, for example, just how the front relation is being projected. For instance, vari-
ous different perspectives could be used in this situation. The front direction could be deﬁned based on the intrinsic front
side of the bus, or on the current direction of movement of the bus (which could be going backwards), or on an onlooker’s
perspective; each of these yield different regions for ‘front’ (at least potentially). Furthermore, the given semantics does not
have anything to say about whether or not the bus is currently in motion. In the former interpretation, it is additionally
unclear whether the process of running is directed or the actor is running in circles; therefore, the speciﬁcation in GUM
remains on the branch above the differentiation of NonAffectingSimpleMotion and NonAffectingDirectedMotion. All of these
details would have to be derived from the discourse context, which is likely to either provide enough information to rule
out some of the available alternatives or else render them irrelevant. In short, beyond the inferences described above that
can actually be made based on the semantics of the two basic interpretations, there is neither a necessity nor a semantic
basis for spelling out the broad range of possible geometric conﬁgurations potentially represented by this utterance.
In our last examples, we show how the deﬁnitions in GUM can also be used to block invalid reasoning chains that might
otherwise be invoked. For example, GUM does not specify projective relations to be transitive. It might be thought that it is
a matter of the lexical semantics that one can infer from ‘A’ being to the left of ‘B’ and ‘B’ being to the left of ‘C’, that ‘A’ is
also to the left of ‘C’. But this is misleading. It can readily turn out that, due to differences in granularity or objects arranged
in circles, etc. (cf. [81]), that such relations do not hold. We need to be very cautious about specifying such information as
additional axioms in the linguistic semantics therefore. A more appropriate place to state such regularities is in the abstract
representations of space, since here it is possible, for example, to specify precisely transitive and inverse relations among
projective relations and to determine when they hold—regardless of linguistic descriptions and their inferences. Many such
speciﬁcations have been developed within the ﬁeld of qualitative spatial representation and reasoning [42]—the double-
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performed on the basis of the calculus, i.e., it can be analyzed whether ‘left’ is the inverse of ‘right’ in a given situation. This
has been illustrated with respect to several parts of GUM—for example, the horizontal projective relations are related to
the double-cross calculus in Hois and Kutz [81].27 Further informal examples of the link between linguistic semantics and
formal spatial theories have been presented by Bateman, Tenbrink and Farrar [19], while examples of the modular formal
spatial theories we employ independently of language can be seen in Bateman et al. [14].
There are also interesting interactions with compositionality speciﬁcally concerned with what interpretative work is done
where. For example, in the approach of Asher and Sablayrolles [6], certain information is pushed down into the lexical items
of individual verb families that from our perspective may be better located at the conﬁguration level. Asher and Sablayrolles
note, for example, that for a verb such as ‘run’ (again their examples are actually in French but we will only use translations
for current purposes) it is not yet possible to fully specify whether movement from a location to another location is taking
place:
(39) The man ran to the park.
(40) The man ran on the spot.
To cope with this, they suggest adding a defeasible inference to the lexical semantics of ‘run’ concerning whether or not
the eventuality described involves change of location. The corresponding GUM speciﬁcations instead move this information
up to the conﬁguration: example (39) involves a NonAffectingMotion and a destination relation within a route, while (40) is
a NonAffectingDirectedMotion with an associated placement relation. All that ‘run’ as a kind of Process itself contributes is
a manner of moving; the question of whether a location-change is involved is not linguistically constructed outside of the
context of an entire clause. Again this means that we can avoid importing defeasible rules into our linguistic semantics.
5.3. Conclusions and discussion
In this section, we have described the use of GUM as part of larger natural language processing systems and the kinds
of contributions that it makes to compositional semantic interpretation and subsequent inference processes. We should
also compare GUM with other ontologies that contain descriptions of space, particularly those that build on principles of
ontological engineering. Ontology already plays an important role here and we ﬁnd several areas where explicit ontological
formalizations have been pursued (cf. [59,38,60,57,52]). Normative standards, such as OGC’s GML (ISO 19136) and OpenGIS,
also relate well to ontological accounts but have not been shaped signiﬁcantly by linguistic concerns. As a consequence they
only address half of the language–space relationship, leading to the problems set out in detail in Section 2. Similarly, it is
diﬃcult to relate spatial ontologies that deﬁne categories of linguistic spatial relations according to ‘conceptual’ schemes
(e.g., [143,121]) to GUM without compromising the ﬂexibility of usage characteristic of natural spatial language.
Some general purpose ontologies also contain signiﬁcant information about space; for example both ResearchCyc28 and
the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO: [125]) formalize a variety of spatial theories; Bateman and Farrar offer an
extensive overview of this area [15]. The base ontology of SUMO, for example, deﬁnes several general spatial concepts.
One of them with a substantial number of subconcepts is the category SpatialRelation representing many spatial relations
based on mereological and topological relations. Although this categorization of relationships appears to have much in
common with the distinctions drawn in GUM, substantial differences arise due to their very different purposes: i.e., SUMO
does not try to cover the meaning of spatial language while GUM’s categorization is strictly based on the requirements of
treating natural language semantics. Many cases motivated by linguistic examples are not then covered. Moreover, the term
SpatialRelation does not seem to be used consistently in the SUMO categorization because it also reﬂects information about
relations between size properties of entities, i.e., larger and smaller, which is covered by a ScaledComparison conﬁguration
in GUM and is independent of any speciﬁc spatial conﬁguration. Most importantly, the central SUMO function WhereFn
does not account at all for the complex construction of the relative position of an object and its relatum covered by GUM’s
GeneralizedLocation.
Another ontology-like organization that is much more closely linked with linguistic evidence and which also includes
some spatially relevant characterizations is the FrameNet lexical database [10], part of the Berkeley FrameNet project. Infor-
mation within FrameNet is primarily motivated by lexicographic concerns and provides a representation of lexical semantics
in terms of the ‘frames’ that words may appear in and the distinctive sets of ‘roles’ that such frames provide. Frames
concerning spatial aspects include Motion, Motion_scenario, Motion_directional, Moving_in_place, Cause_to_move_in_place and
Quitting_a_place. Each of these deﬁnes roles that express information such as the mover, the direction, the place, the path
and so on. Although a ﬁne-grained articulation of the semantics of spatial modalities and other particularly spatial details
has not been one of FrameNet’s goals, it does exhibit several points of overlap with the distinctions drawn in GUM and
a detailed investigation of alignment between the FrameNet examples and a GUM classiﬁcation would be of considerable
interest. Certain distinctions drawn in GUM—for example between placements and routes or between path placements and
27 See also the corresponding formal speciﬁcation at http://www.ontospace.uni-bremen.de/ontology/gum-space/GUMwithDCC.html.
28 http://research.cyc.com.
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cases the FrameNet analyses appear to be including contextualization decisions in their assignment of roles. This is partly due
to the lexical orientation of FrameNet, which, as we argued in Section 3 above, systematically undervalues the contribution
of grammatical evidence. We would predict that this should impact negatively on automatic classiﬁcation based on the
FrameNet scheme.
Several more lexically-oriented classiﬁcations are similar in this respect, although nevertheless offering well-motivated
groupings of lexical items that could beneﬁcially be linked with the GUM-based lexical semantics. VerbNet [92],29 for
example, organizes verb entries by the range of grammatical alternations and argument restrictions that clauses containing
the verbs enter into. This extends the basic work on alternations of Levin [109] and also exhibits similarities with our
methodology of isolating grammatical syndromes. However, the approach is less inclusive in terms of the grammatical
phenomena admitted as evidence and, perhaps as a result of this, the resulting organization is quite ﬂat. Although a good
source of information concerning the range of lexicalizations available, the distinction between different kinds of spatial
relationships is not addressed in detail. Similar potentially useful but partial sources of linguistic information can be found
in initiatives such as ‘The Preposition Project’ (TPP),30 which contains senses of particular lexical prepositions, including
those with spatial meaning.
In contrast to these directions, a non-lexically inspired ontology that speciﬁcally focuses on spatial aspects in natural
language and which is intended to be used within a spatial application for human robot interaction is that mentioned
above of Kruijff et al. [96]. This is closer to the organization proposed by GUM, although the grammatical evidence appealed
to is less broad and there has been less of an attempt to evaluate the semantic representations against naturalistic data.
The ontology does not then make the ﬁne-grained distinctions between spatial relations and spatial conﬁgurations that
can be found in the spatial extension of GUM. Moreover, the basic two-level semantics division between semantics and
conceptual/contextual information is not maintained, leading to over-committed interpretations.
Finally, it is interesting to note that several approaches to processing spatial language now rely on linguistically-motivated
classiﬁcations of the linguistic utterances that occur. However, these all provide a limited range of relevant abstractions due,
on the one hand, to their task and application-speciﬁc focus and, on the other, to their appeal to a narrower range of
linguistic evidence. Denis and colleagues [50,48], for example, provide a ﬁve-way classiﬁcation of the components of spatial
navigation, including actions, actions with landmarks, introduction of new landmarks, descriptions of landmarks and ‘others’.
Similarly, Levit and Roy [112] simulate the interpretation of path descriptions (also with respect to the Map Task corpus that
we mention below) by means of a probability-based combination of what they term navigational information units (NIUs).
NIUs form an “intermediate” form of representation based on a subset of the literature of spatial linguistic expressions,
and invoke categories such as to (“in a straight line approach the closest point of a reference object”), away_from (“move
in the direction opposite to centre mass of a reference object”), path and so on. These categories form a small subset
of those available within the Generalized Upper Model. However, although Levit and Roy’s system relied on handcoded
manual construction of NIUs—the connections between actual linguistic expressions and NIUs speciﬁcations had not been
implemented—they argued nevertheless that such an “intermediate” representation is a valuable step in grounding certain
spatial communication tasks, regardless of how it is achieved. The semantic speciﬁcations provided by GUM can be seen in
precisely this light, providing a representation intermediate between utterances and contextualization. And, what is more,
in the case of GUM the connection between linguistic form and semantic speciﬁcation has been implemented. It would be
an interesting further step, therefore, to examine whether the probabilistic modeling provided for the NIUs could also be
extended to cover GUM speciﬁcations.
6. Ontology evaluation, coverage and agreement
While Section 5 discussed GUM’s adequacy and applicability with respect to compositionality, inference, and application,
this section evaluates GUM with respect to data coverage and inter-annotator agreements when the ontology is used for
linguistic data annotation. In both areas we will see that GUM appears to provide a signiﬁcant and measurable advance in
the treatment of spatial language and its semantics.
6.1. Broad corpus-driven evaluation of linguistic coverage
For the reasons explained above, we must consider the breadth of GUM’s coverage of linguistic data and not only its
detail. To support this we have analyzed how GUM speciﬁcations fare when classifying natural language utterances taken
from a broader set of test corpora. In addition, we attempt here to provide a further important aspect of quality control by
providing evaluation metrics to benchmark coverage and to record gaps as well as growth as we move to new application
areas.
The broader set of test corpora considered were deliberately selected in order to exhibit a considerable quantity of
spatial language. For this we used seven different spatial language corpora containing natural language collected in English
29 Cf. the ‘uniﬁed verb index’ available at: http://verbs.colorado.edu/verb-index/index.php.
30 http://www.clres.com/prepositions.html.
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Distribution of spatial conﬁguration types against analyzed corpora.
Conﬁgurations MapTask Trains IBL Bielefeld AIBO Stuga Rolland Total
CE1 CE2 CE3 CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4
SpatialLocating 65 12 27 32 57 26 76 295
NonAffectingDirectedMotion 44 26 57 7 67 44 36 281
AffectingDirectedMotion 1 38 54 2 5 100
NonAffectingOrientationChange 10 1 11 22
NonAffectingOrienting 1 7 1 9
AffectingOrientationChange 3 3
NonAffectingMotion 1 1 2
Totals 110 76 95 104 126 72 129 712
and German. The use of spatial corpora rather than broader coverage resources such as the British National Corpus [29]
was to ensure both that a breadth of spatial terminology was included and that complex constructions which involve a
number of related spatial constructions were available in the data set. For English analysis, three spatial language corpora
were selected: the Trains 93 Dialogues [72], the HCRC Map Task [3], and the IBL (Instruction Based Learning) Corpus [107].
For German, four spatial corpora were selected for analysis: the Bielefeld SFB 360 Corpus [141], and three corpora gathered
in recent years within our own group: Aibo2 [56], Rolland [156,142], and Stuga (unpublished route description corpus).31 As
all of these corpora are collections of task-oriented dialogues in the spatial domain, they contain a wide variety of spatial
terms including localizing expressions, spatial action descriptions, and route descriptions—although the proportion of these
features is by no means evenly distributed as will be discussed below.
Source data selection proceeded by collecting a sample set of “spatial language utterances” from each of the considered
corpora. These utterances were selected on the basis of their containing either one or more clauses judged to convey
spatial action, motion, or localization information directly, or a clause constituent which conveyed placement or direction
information within another clause type. Clauses with idiomatic or metaphorical uses of spatial terms were not considered.
For the TRAINS 93 corpus, four dialogues, i.e., D93-11.3, D93-15.5, D93-19.1, and D93-26.3, were selected at random, from
which the ﬁrst 100 utterances with spatial contributions were extracted. Similarly, the ﬁrst 100 spatial utterances were
extracted from three randomly selected IBL dialogues: u4, u15, and u17. For the Map Task dialogues, which are considerably
longer and more complex than Trains or IBL dialogues, one dialogue was selected at random, q1nc4, from which the ﬁrst
100 spatial utterances were similarly extracted. For the Bielefeld SFB 360 Corpus, 100 examples were taken from dialogues
about assembling a propeller aircraft.32 Five examples each were selected from Dialog01 to Dialog19 together with ﬁve
examples from Dialog20 to Dialog22 according to their variety of different spatial expressions. Similarly, 100 utterances
were extracted from ID A001 to A051 of the Aibo2 Corpus, which mostly includes route instructions from human–robot
interaction in a naive user exploration scenario. For the Rolland Corpus, 100 utterances from R001 to R034 were selected
randomly, comprising utterances expressed in a further scene exploration task. For the Stuga Corpus, 30 utterances were
extracted at random from D001 to D020, including expressions about route descriptions within a human–human-interaction
scenario. The total test corpus consisted of 630 spatial utterances. Analysis then proceeded by ‘cleaning’ the surface language
in each utterance to isolate the core surface spatial information conveyed. Speciﬁcally, non-spatial content such as conﬂated
conﬁrmation speech acts, conﬂated stalls or other communication management content, plus non-spatial modiﬁcations of
nouns or verbs were removed so as to focus on spatial content. The resulting utterances do not constitute canonical forms,
however, since they remain close to the original surface language with lexical choice and other structural information
preserved for spatial content.
A GUM speciﬁcation was then assigned for each pre-processed utterance, providing a ‘semantic annotation’ for each unit.
This assignment was performed manually by native speakers of the analyzed language against the category descriptions
provided by GUM and involved the bottom-up assignment of semantic categories to constituents of each utterance. The
result was a complete GUM semantic description of the kind illustrated in previous sections. The corpus of 630 analyzed
utterances gave 712 instances of spatially-relevant Configurations and 918 instances of SpatialModality. The utterances, their
pre-processed forms, and the speciﬁcations of the surface spatial semantics are available online as part of the GUM doc-
umentation.33 Of the total included in the target test corpus collection, a spatial semantics was successfully allocated to
592 of the utterances, leaving just over 6% of the corpus for which the spatial import of these utterances was not judged
to be adequately covered. Segments for which no spatial semantics were judged adequate included a number of manner
expressions and reciprocal spatial constructions; the coverage of these remains for future work.
This high degree of coverage is already a positive result for GUM. However, we can also use the statistics gathered both
to isolate areas where further development should be undertaken and to pinpoint design requirements for further corpus
collection activities. The GUM categories of Configuration and SpatialModality and their subconcepts provide a precise spec-
iﬁcation of a diverse range of linguistically construed spatial situations. When considering a corpus of spatial expressions,
31 This selection is due to the fact that the same breadth of public spatial corpora is not yet available for German as for English.
32 http://www.sfb360.uni-bielefeld.de/transkript/b1-txt/.
33 See: http://www.ontospace.uni-bremen.de/ontology/evaluation/gum-evaluation.html.
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Distribution of spatial modality types against analyzed corpora ordered by total number of spatial modalities present.
SM CE1 CE2 CE3 CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4 Total SM CE1 CE2 CE3 CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4 Total
GDN 8 81 22 3 53 7 8 182 Distr 2 3 8 1 14
LP 16 19 1 7 24 29 96 Cent 2 2 7 2 13
Sup 6 7 36 5 10 9 73 Card 1 11 12
RP 7 11 1 14 14 24 71 LPE 12 12
FP 3 1 4 2 11 13 10 44 RPE 4 2 4 1 1 12
Cont 1 14 1 12 2 3 7 40 BPE 4 5 9
PRE 8 1 13 4 3 9 38 DOFC 1 1 1 5 8
SD 19 12 2 33 API 8 8
FPE 2 2 15 11 3 33 QnD 2 1 1 2 6
GDD 2 20 3 1 1 3 30 BPI 3 2 1 6
UPE 15 14 29 Arc 3 1 2 6
QlD 2 7 6 11 26 NPA 5 5
Prox 7 9 7 1 2 26 APE 5 5
OPE 8 4 14 26 PR 1 1 2 4
RNPA 5 14 2 21 AP 3 3
GD 7 2 5 3 1 3 21 Distal 1 2 3
Peri 8 1 10 1 20 RPI 2 2
BP 7 1 2 3 1 4 18 Topo 1 1
PRI 4 1 6 5 16 Seq 1 1
Sur 1 1 7 2 5 16 LPI 1 1
Abbreviations for the corpora as used above; abbreviations used for spatial modalities: AP: AboveProjection, APE: AboveProjectionExternal, API: Above-
ProjectionInternal, Arc: ArcDirectional, BP: BackProjection, BPE: BackProjectionExternal, BPI: BackProjectionInternal, Card: Cardinality, Cent: Central, Cont:
Containment, DOFC: DenialOfFunctionalControl, Distal: Distal, Distr: Distribution, FCE: Functional Controlled External, FCI: FunctionalControlledInternal, FP:
FrontProjection, FPE: FrontProjectionExternal, GD: GeneralDirectional, GDD: GeneralDirectionalDistancing, GDN: GeneralDirectionalNearing, LP: LeftProjec-
tion, LPE: LeftProjectionExternal, LPI: LeftProjectionInternal, NPA: NonProjectionAxial, OPE: OverProjectionExternal, Per: Peripheral, PR: PathRepresenting,
PRE: PathRepresentingExternal, PRI: PathRepresentingInternal, Prox: Proximal, QnD: QuantitativeDistance, QtD: QualitativeDistance, RNPA: RelativeNon-
ProjectionAxial, RP: RightProjection, RPE: RightProjectionExternal, RPI: RightProjectionInternal, SD: SpeciﬁcDirectional, Seq: Sequential, Sup: Support, Sur:
Surrounding, Topo: TopographicDirectional, UPE: UnderProjectionExternal.
therefore, we can consider to what extent the diversity of the utterances occurring in the corpus overlap with the diversity
of situations covered by the ontology. Our present results show that the spatial language corpora considered offer only a
limited range of situations. If our randomly selected subset is in any way representative of their respective corpora (and we
have no reason to presume it is not), then this lack of diversity limits our ability to effectively benchmark existing coverage.
We see this concretely in the overviews of our results given in Tables 2 and 3, which show the distribution of spatial con-
ﬁguration types and spatial modality types against the corpora analyzed. In Table 2 it can be seen that the corpora contain
a large number of spatial locating and directed motion conﬁgurations with a very much smaller number of orientation
changes and orienting. In order to probe the accuracy and coverage of these other areas of GUM, it will be necessary to
ﬁnd many more naturally occurring examples—either in other corpora or by means of focused experiments which require
expressions in the desired semantic areas.
Similarly, with the spatial modalities presented in Table 3, we see large proportions of uses for modalities such as
GeneralDirectionalNearing, FrontProjection, LeftProjection, and Support, about ten further modalities having relatively frequent
use, and several that are seen only occasionally in the data. Spatial modalities not seen at all in the data include ab-
stract modalities which would be accounted for by sub-categories, e.g., Connection, and one terminal GUM spatial modality,
MultipleDirectional, which is used to capture the non-directed motion in a use such as “they walked around town”. Again
it would be desirable to ﬁnd more examples of the infrequently occurring spatial modalities, as it is certain that there is
much more detail to bring out here. The distribution that we observe also provides a semantic characterization of the par-
ticular text types that made up the originating corpora; the large proportion of route descriptions, for example, contribute
signiﬁcantly to the preponderance of general directionals, etc.
As the coverage of both the GUM linguistic ontology and the number of annotated corpora linked to the linguistic
ontology grow, statistics of this kind will provide useful metadata concerning the material covered. This can then be used for
guiding further development, exploring corpora containing lesser used spatial information or pulling apart already covered
areas of spatial information in ﬁner detail. We can also draw in other areas of spatial work and treat these as corpora for
benchmarking GUM coverage: for example, several of the lexicographically-oriented lexicon projects mentioned above also
include spatial examples relevant for benchmarking; similarly, considering linguistic annotations such as those investigated
to date by the SpatialML spatial markup language initiative [116] would also usefully complement the range of linguistic
phenomena considered to date.
6.2. Inter-annotator agreement
The GUM ontology can also be interpreted as an annotation schema for natural language sentences in its own right. This
offers a further method for its evaluation, i.e., by carrying out annotation tasks and measuring the degree of agreement that
different annotators achieve. We can then apply existing methods for evaluating the reliability and usability of the ontology
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Inter-annotator agreement: results for GUM’s spatial conﬁguration, relation, modality and modiﬁcation of English data sample. The table shows pairwise
comparisons between annotator E1, E2, and GS.
Category Percent agreement Cohen’s Kappa Agreements Disagreements Cases Categories used
(%) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)
E1–E2 conﬁguration 71.3 0.59 82 33 115 8
spatial role 75.6 0.70 146 47 193 12
modality 70.6 0.67 101 42 143 24
modiﬁcation 66.7 0.59 10 5 15 5
E1–GS conﬁguration 76.5 0.67 88 27 115 8
spatial role 83.4 0.79 161 32 193 12
modality 76.9 0.74 110 33 143 24
modiﬁcation 73.3 0.66 11 4 15 5
E2–GS conﬁguration 87.0 0.81 100 15 115 8
spatial role 87.6 0.84 169 24 193 12
modality 71.3 0.67 102 41 143 24
modiﬁcation 73.3 0.67 11 4 15 5
Table 5
Inter-annotator agreement: results for GUM’s spatial conﬁguration, relation, modality and modiﬁcation of German data sample. The table shows pairwise
comparisons between annotator G1, G2, and GS.
Category Percent agreement Cohen’s Kappa Agreements Disagreements Cases Categories used
(%) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)
G1–G2 conﬁguration 87.5 0.79 119 17 136 9
spatial role 78.1 0.72 139 39 178 12
modality 68.3 0.66 112 52 164 36
modiﬁcation 69.8 0.64 60 26 86 10
G1–GS conﬁguration 86.8 0.79 118 18 136 9
spatial role 78.7 0.73 140 38 178 12
modality 73.2 0.71 120 44 164 36
modiﬁcation 70.9 0.65 61 25 86 10
G2–GS conﬁguration 80.1 0.69 109 27 136 9
spatial role 82.0 0.77 146 32 178 12
modality 73.8 0.72 121 43 164 36
modiﬁcation 74.4 0.69 64 22 86 10
considered as an annotation scheme. Such measurements can be used to show the reliability and comprehensibility of
GUM’s speciﬁcation: if different annotators annotate similar sentences in a similar way, this supports the claim that GUM
provides regularly recognizable distinctions between categories. Inter-annotator agreement measures of this kind are not
intended to prove that GUM represents actual human conceptual structures of space or the language of space; rather what
can be shown is that GUM’s categories can be learned by non-experts, that the categories (after a training phase) can be
distinguished correctly, and that they are not randomly chosen for some linguistic terms.
Here we present results from an exploratory study of inter-annotator agreement that we have conducted with four anno-
tators, two native German annotators (G1 and G2) and two native English annotators (E1 and E2), who were not previously
familiar with GUM and its organization [79]. Based on the guidelines for organizing inter-annotator agreement studies set
out by Lombard et al. [114], all annotators were provided with a manual on how to annotate sentences with GUM together
with a spreadsheet document reﬂecting the structure of the GUM categories.34 The annotation task was split into a training
phase with 10 sentences, a supervised annotation phase with 2×50 sentences, and an unsupervised annotation sample with
100 German and 90 English sentences. Inter-annotator agreement was calculated for the unsupervised annotation samples.
All of these sentences were taken from the data set used to measure GUM’s coverage (cf. Section 6.1). The GUM speci-
ﬁcations from this data set were used as a “gold standard” [69], counting them as a ‘third annotator’ (GS) per language.
Annotators were instructed (i) to clean up the sentences, i.e., to remove non-spatial information from the sentences and
grammatically correct them if necessary, and (ii) to annotate the sentences according to the GUM speciﬁcation as given by
the spreadsheet document.
We compare the annotation results based on the different parts of the GUM speciﬁcation, namely the particular sub-
types of Configuration (such as SpatialLocating, NonAffectingDirectedMotion, etc.), attribute (such as placement, direction, etc.),
SpatialModality (such as LeftProjectionExternal, Proximal, etc.) and modification (such as extension, accessibility, etc.) that the
annotators selected. Hence, the major decision points within the annotation or speciﬁcation for a sentence were investi-
gated. The results of agreements between the annotators E1, E2, and GS for the English data sample are shown in Table 4;
results for G1, G2, and GS for the German data sample are shown in Table 5.
34 The annotation sources are available at http://www.ontospace.uni-bremen.de/ontology/evaluation/gum-evaluation.html.
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tions, 193 spatial roles, 143 modalities, and 15 modiﬁcations that were used for comparing agreement. Due to the clean-up
task, we had to remove 15 additional conﬁgurations as the annotations did not refer to the same sentences. The calculation
of agreement was performed in a ‘strict’ fashion, i.e., even similar categories (e.g., LeftProjection and LeftProjectionInternal,
or direction and motionDirection) were regarded here as different annotations and marked as disagreements. The results in
Table 4 show agreement on all categories to be above 70%, except for the agreement on modifications between annotator
E1 and E2. Modiﬁcations, however, only occurred in 15 cases. Particularly promising are the results for spatial modalities: a
wide range of 24 different categories were used by the annotators and their agreement is still higher than 70%. Also Cohen’s
Kappa, a standard measure of agreement [41], is on average slightly above 0.7 over all comparisons, which is also a good
positive indication of the reliability of the annotation decisions made.
The German sample with 100 sentences was taken from Rolland and Aibo (see Section 6.1) and contains 136 conﬁgu-
rations, 178 spatial roles, 164 modalities, and 86 modiﬁcations. Agreements between annotators were compared as for the
English annotations. Due to the clean-up task, 16 additional conﬁgurations were removed, and as with the English sample,
the calculation of agreement was performed ‘strictly’. The results in Table 5 show agreement on all categories above 70%,
except for the agreement on modalities and modifications between annotator G1 and G2. The number of modalities that were
used, however, is 36 and this therefore shows a broad variety of different types. If we would factor out over- or underspec-
iﬁcations (for instance, combining FrontProjectionExternal with FrontProjection, etc.), the agreement is above 80%; we omit
such calculation here, however. Also Cohen’s Kappa is in most cases above 0.7 for all comparisons, which again indicates
reliability similar to the English corpus samples.
An interesting ﬁnding from the annotation evaluation is that some annotations illustrate dependencies from the modality
hierarchy (cf. Fig. 7)—even without explicit knowledge of the annotators since they were not informed about the modal-
ities’ hierarchical structure. In sentence (41) taken from the German sample, for instance, the annotation of the ‘gold
standard’ for gegenüber (opposite side) is the modality Proximal. Both German annotators, however, annotated this modal-
ity as a FrontProjectionExternal. Although this category is too speciﬁc for the relationship of being on the opposite side, it is
a subcategory of Proximal. Hence, both categories shows a strong connection—formalized by the hierarchical relationship in
GUM and implicitly indicated by the annotations.
(41) Es ist gegenüber von mir. [It is opposite me.]
On average the results show a high agreement between the different annotators. This also proves that with the use of a
manual, uninformed annotators can be taught to apply the decision options in GUM and to decide on a speciﬁc conﬁguration
with its spatial roles ﬁlled with a high variety of different modality types and modiﬁcations.
6.3. Discussion
The empirical, corpus-driven approach to ontology evaluation presented in this section has been useful for several rea-
sons. First, we have seen both that the GUM spatial extension covers existing spatial language corpora well and that those
corpora need to be extended in breadth to provide more data for further linguistic ontology development. And second, we
have demonstrated both that it is possible to use a linguistic ontology to inform the semantic annotation of linguistic data
and that, when this is done, the results show a promising degree of reliability. All of these directions need to be taken
further in future research.
7. Conclusion and outlook
Our starting point in this paper was the extremely ﬂexible relationship observed between spatial language and contex-
tualized interpretations of that language. There is an urgent need for versatile and comprehensive accounts that support the
contextualization process by pinpointing the information that needs to be anchored by context without prematurely over-
committing to particular spatial interpretations. We have addressed this by considering the linguistic construction of space
far more closely than has hitherto been the case. This has led to a ‘linguistically responsible’ characterization of the seman-
tic distinctions that are carried by grammar (at least in English and German), couched as an extension of the Generalized
Upper Model linguistic ontology and employing current ontological engineering principles.
We have shown that this treatment covers a large proportion of naturally occurring linguistic expressions involving
space. Simple inventories of linguistic terms (and their direct semantic interpretation in terms of physical spatial models)
have been replaced by a richly structured characterization of linguistically-motivated spatial semantics that provides strong
support for active mediation between linguistic form and detailed spatial models. This characterization generalizes across
contexts of use and applications, just as the corresponding linguistic expressions do. The Generalized Upper Model spatial
extension is now accordingly employed as a level of linguistic semantics for both automatic generation and analysis within
spatially-aware computational systems. We have seen that GUM lies within the description logic ALCHQ(D) and, as a
consequence, any appropriate DL reasoner can be applied to provide reasoning support. Moreover, to support usability
further, GUM is accessible online as an OWL DL speciﬁcation including detailed comments about its categories and relations
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enforcing ontological requirements of consistency and respect for identity criteria.
We claim that an adequate account of linguistic spatial expressions will require at least the kinds of distinctions that
our characterization has set out, independently of how these distinctions are then anchored in axiomatizations of space of
particular kinds, in action routines for embodied behavior, or in perceptual models. The linguistic variability deployed in
spatial expressions exhibits the distinctions drawn and so brings constraints to bear on the properties that any such models
need to provide. The categories of the formalization we develop thereby support mediation, by virtue of the constraints
they bring, but without imposing commitment to particular underlying formal systems. This allows us to remain relatively
agnostic about the spatial models employed in any particular application system or theoretical account, thereby further
supporting re-use.
We are now extending the coverage of GUM, benchmarking progress against a broadening range of corpora of natu-
rally occurring spatial language. Particular areas being added include that required for describing geographic information,
as explored for the spatial language annotation task within SpatialML [116], and the consequences of pursuing similar de-
scriptions in other natural languages. Setting out explicit connections between the categories of GUM and the semantic
requirements of languages other than English and German will be crucial for determining the extent to which the spa-
tial extension of GUM needs to vary across languages. In this area also, there is a substantial body of previous work to
draw on [6,32,76,153]; at present we assume both that further spatial modalities will be discovered and that there will
be variations in the spatial modalities required by speciﬁc languages. Moreover, in all cases of extension, we will continue
to develop the formalization of the spatial interpretation, using GUM as the linguistic component of a formally speciﬁed
heterogeneous account mediating between language use and contextualized interpretation.
Finally, the account is now suﬃciently detailed and concrete, that we can consider how to extend the range of evidence
that can be drawn upon for investigating its adequacy and appropriateness. We have described our use and evaluation
of the GUM organization as an annotation scheme above, and this needs to be taken further. We can also investigate in
greater depth the formal relationships between the spatial theories that are taken as appropriate interpretations of distinct
portions of the GUM concept hierarchy—here it will be interesting to appeal to current research exploring characterizations
of spatial calculi in general in order to see if parallels between the GUM organization and the formal ‘meta’-structure of
this domain can be isolated. There is also the possibility of psychological investigation: now that a ﬁrm relationship has
been posited between distinct areas of spatial linguistic semantics and linguistic forms, we can explore to what extent
this is supported empirically. Carlson and colleagues (e.g., [35,34]), for example, have performed experiments which show
challenging and ‘non-standard’ connections between the spatial information activated by particular linguistic terms, such as
‘distance’ information being activated by projective terms such as ‘left’/‘right’, etc. Investigations of whether such activations
follow the connections suggested within GUM may throw new light on its organization as a whole. Moreover, as Carlson
and van Deman conclude:
“The premise in the literature has been that different terms are associated with different information. . . . However, the
current results indicate that a distinction must be made between the semantics conveyed by the term itself, and the
information deemed relevant during the processing of the spatial term” [35, p. 434].
We see this as offering potential support for precisely the kind of two-level architecture that we have proposed: the lin-
guistic ontology provides the semantics of the ‘terms themselves’, but when this is anchored to contextualized spatial
interpretations further kinds of information may naturally be entailed. There is then considerable opportunity for targeted
investigation using both the general architecture we propose and the particular distinctions we have developed within this.
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